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The World Cup: Tactical Interpretations for FM14


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Germany's counter attacks were mostly focused down Marcelo's flank. Man, he was caught out so many times it's almost sad.

This concept definitely shouldn't be overlooked though because this is something that happens in FM (as it should) too.. So while we may have a good laugh at Brazil, I bet lots of us have had similar awful defensive showings yeah?

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Germany's counter attacks were mostly focused down Marcelo's flank. Man, he was caught out so many times it's almost sad.

This concept definitely shouldn't be overlooked though because this is something that happens in FM (as it should) too.. So while we may have a good laugh at Brazil, I bet lots of us have had similar awful defensive showings yeah?

I have had many a bababooey at my team and their defensive frailties, end if the day it has been mostly my fault and I am sure Scolari must shoulder most of the blame.

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Germany's counter attacks were mostly focused down Marcelo's flank. Man, he was caught out so many times it's almost sad.

This concept definitely shouldn't be overlooked though because this is something that happens in FM (as it should) too.. So while we may have a good laugh at Brazil, I bet lots of us have had similar awful defensive showings yeah?

Yeah, you're right. But at some point adjustments have to be made, on the manager side as well as on the player side. As an outside back myself, I love going forward and my coach lets me do it freely. However, it's pretty easy to see when the opponent tries to exploit my flank (and succeeds doing so). At those times I have to be more careful and choose my moments. And in the end, if I was playing against a player of Thomas Muller's calibre, with my main cover coming from a centre-back that hasn't played for 2 months, it would certainly be advisable that I be wiser in possession. Even if my manager didn't tell me.

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Holland did not win... :(

Still Louis van Gaal has done an excellent job getting this team so far in the World Cup. I really hope my country finishes 3rd next saturday.

I also hope his tactical geniousness can be translated in a FM tactic that has just as many options as in really life. Would it be hard to implement the left back / right back role that Dirk Kuijt had?

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Quick question. I haven't really moved too far from some of the more established midfield roles, (with the exception of Regista now), but I was really intrigued by Mascherano's role the other night and wondered was there something that was similar without too many individual instructions. Although I have never used it, I was thinking HB, but there doesn't seem to be a lot of info to go there.

Any thoughts?

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GERMANY

Bringing the tournament to its logical and seemingly inevitable conclusion, the Germans carried out yet another dominant performance against an admirably bold and unflinching Argentina. Though Germany were comfortably in control of possession for the entirety of the match, the unfolding tactical battle was a more balanced contest between a fluid, high-pressing possession style and a highly structured, deep-lying transition style with both teams making an earnest effort to actually win the game in regulation time. The Germans ultimately proved worthy champions, but Sabella was determined to find a way to solve the German puzzle and Löw was forced to adapt throughout the match to maintain the upper hand.

Germany's initial set-up was similar to what they've used throughout the knockout the rounds, though a training injury to Khedira required a slight adjustment to Kroos and Lahm's roles. Leverkusen's Christoph Kramer was brought on as a replacement with Löw deciding to give him a more direct and attacking role while Lahm was asked to play a more dynamic, creative role on the right flank. To balance out these changes, Kroos moved into a deeper, more defensive role mirroring Schweinsteiger in a highly versatile double pivot. Consequently, Germany were effectively using two deep-lying playmakers with Schweinsteiger and Kroos collectively attempting an incredible 212 passes.

mOG77CV.png

However, an injury to Kramer prompted the introduction of Schürrle and a slight change of system. The Germans briefly operated in a 4411 shape with Özil moving his creative efforts into a more central position, but this was again changed in response to Argentina's switch to a 4-3-1-2 at the half. Löw moved back to a 4141 to sever the link to Argentina's dangerous attacking trio, but the Germans struggled to find a way to break through the status quo as Özil and Klose were kept in check by Argentina's impressive defensive efforts.

The pivotal adjustment came with the introduction of the previously out-of-favour Götze, a move that marked a transition back to the highly fluid attacking approach that Germany had attempted at the outset of the group stages. However, whereas Germany had struggled with this approach earlier in the tournament, Argentina's 3-man midfield gave it the space it needed to thrive. The pace and movement of Germany's attackers dragged the exhausted Argentines apart. For the goal, Schürrle dropped deep to receive the ball and pull Gago out of position while Götze drifted to the left to fill the vacated space. In response, Özil and Müller swapped attacking positions to allow the latter to drift into a more central position. From there, the player's naturally assumed one another's roles with Müller dropping off from the defensive line, pulling Demichelis out to cover for the overstretched midfield and opening the fatal gap that allowed Götze to slip in from the left flank and receive Schürrle's cross unopposed.

In the end, Germany had come full circle in terms of their gradual and ultimately circular stylistic evolution throughout the tournament. They had started with a more progressive 4-1-4-1 with a roaming attacking trio comprised of Özil, Müller and Götze. This was to be the bold and innovative identity of Germany's golden generation, the Germany of 2014 and beyond. Yet, this approach had proven uncertain and inconsistent against more disciplined and physical opposition, and by the quarterfinals, Löw had reverted to a hybrid of his 2010 and 2014 approaches with Klose operating as a traditional striker in place of a drifting, creative forward. There was an immensely satisfying narrative quality, then, to the character of this final goal. Götze, coming off the bench as Germany's prodigal son, returned to assert the birthright of the young Germans as the subtle creativity and movement of his unorthodox forward play did what his more traditional counterpart could not. The experience of the old guard may have reliably guided them through the final, but it took the vision and ingenuity of the neue welle to actually win it.

To model the initial system in Football Manager, the German set-up was similar to those posted earlier. The team instructions would be a Fluid/Counter 4-1-4-1 with "Shorter Passing," "Push Higher Up," "Work Ball Into Box" and "Roam from Positions."

The individual roles would be:

GK: Sweeper Keeper - Defend

DL: Fullback - Attack + Cross Less Often + Cross from Byline

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Wingback - Support

DM: Deep Lying Playmaker - Defend

ML: Wide Midfielder - Support + Cross Less Often

MCL: Deep Lying Playmaker - Support + Shoot More Often

MCR: Central Midfielder - Attack + Mark Tigheter + Fewer Risky Passes

MR: Wide Midfielder - Attack + More Risky Passes

STC: Deep Lying Forward - Support + Move Into Channels

ti5EiUb.png

With the introduction of Schürrle, Özil would take up a roaming support duty in the centre with Schurrle operating in an attack duty on the left flank. The introduction of Götze would signal a switch from a Deep Lying Forward to a more mobile and expressive Complete Forward.

ubRVCl2.png

ARGENTINA

While Sabella had clearly made a strategic decision to cede control of the midfield to the Germans, Argentina did not simply look to park the bus and defend inside their own box. Rather, they sought a careful balance between disciplined, defensive solidity at the back and rapid, highly organised transitions aiming to securely work the ball to Messi's feet. This approach was commendably effective as Argentina actually managed to create nearly as many chances as the Germans. Had Higuain and Messi been slightly more clinical, the Argentines could easily have made the game far more uncomfortable for the Germans.

The initial system was based on a 4-4-1-1 defensive shape with Messi drifting about just ahead of the midfield. Attacks were fast but meticulously controlled with the team reluctant to break forward en masse. Instead, counterattacks were carefully focused down the right with Lavezzi bursting forward quickly to link up with Messi and Higuain while Enzo Perez sat deeper to occasionally help Mascherano move the ball out of defence. Zabaleta, similarly, played a very reserved role and, aside from a few early overlapping runs, was focused on neutralising the threat of Özil (and later, Schürrle).

XXw9B8k.png

Sabella was clearly concerned with preserving the team's shape, but even then, he was not afraid to take risks to push for the win. At the half, Aguero was brought on and the team switched to a 4-3-1-2 diamond system. This ensured Messi always had an additional attacker ahead of him, but poor individual performances from Aguero and Higuain meant there was no actual reward for the increased stress placed upon the midfield. Still, Mascherano and Biglia did their best to stave off the German attacks, but fatigue and lack of support from the forward three eventually gave the Germans the opportunity they needed to avoid a shootout.

For the starting system, I would use a Rigid fluidity and Standard mentality. I chose Rigid because the team's attacks were highly structured with the defence primarily concerned with holding shape as the midfield looked to supply chances for Higuain. A Standard mentality was chosen to reflect their tendency to attack in a more methodical manner, moving the ball forward quickly but not committing midfielders and fullbacks forward until the Germans dropped back to deal with Messi. The Argentine defending was also fairly aggressive despite the fact that they dropped very deep. To reflect thieir low block, I would add the team instructions "Much Deeper Defensive Line," and to represent the speed of their attack and the emphasis on keeping the ball on the ground for Messi's benefit, I would also add "Much Higher Tempo" and "Shorter Passing."

For individual roles:

GK: Goalkeeper - Defend

DL: Fullback - Attack

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Fullback - Support

ML: Wide Midfielder - Support + Cross Less Often + Sit Narrower + Shoot Less Often + Less Risky Passes

MCL: Deep Lying Playmaker - Defend + Cross Less Often

MCR: Central Midfielder - Defend

MR: Winger - Attack

AMC: Trequartista - Attack + Shoot More Often + Dribble More

STC: Advanced Forward - Attack + Move Into Channels

NefSw1V.png

For the system used after the first half, switch to a 4-3-1-2 with the ML switched to a Central Midfielder (Support) and the MR switched to a Complete Forward (Support) with a personal instruction to "Move Into Channels."

lsFAmUc.png

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GERMANY

Bringing the tournament to its logical and seemingly inevitable conclusion, the Germans carried out yet another dominant performance against an admirably bold and unflinching Argentina. Though Germany were comfortably in control of possession for the entirety of the match, the unfolding tactical battle was a more balanced contest between a fluid, high-pressing possession style and a highly structured, deep-lying transition style with both teams making an earnest effort to actually win the game in regulation time. The Germans ultimately proved worthy champions, but Sabella was determined to find a way to solve the German puzzle and Löw was forced to adapt throughout the match to maintain the upper hand.

Germany's initial set-up was similar to what they've used throughout the knockout the rounds, though a training injury to Khedira required a slight adjustment to Kroos and Lahm's roles. Leverkusen's Christoph Kramer was brought on as a replacement with Löw deciding to give him a more direct and attacking role while Lahm was asked to play a more dynamic, creative role on the right flank. To balance out these changes, Kroos moved into a deeper, more defensive role mirroring Schweinsteiger in a highly versatile double pivot. Consequently, Germany were effectively using two deep-lying playmakers with Schweinsteiger and Kroos collectively attempting an incredible 212 passes.

mOG77CV.png

However, an injury to Kramer prompted the introduction of Schürrle and a slight change of system. The Germans briefly operated in a 4411 shape with Özil moving his creative efforts into a more central position, but this was again changed in response to Argentina's switch to a 4-3-1-2 at the half. Löw moved back to a 4141 to sever the link to Argentina's dangerous attacking trio, but the Germans continued to break through the status quo as Özil and Klose were kept in check by Argentina's impressive defensive efforts.

The pivotal adjustment came with the introduction of the previously out-of-favour Götze, a move that marked a transition back to the highly fluid attacking approach that Germany had attempted at the outset of the group stages. However, whereas Germany had struggled with this approach earlier in the tournament, Argentina's 3-man midfield gave it the space it needed to thrive. The pace and movement of Germany's attackers dragged the exhausted Argentines apart. For the goal, Schürrle dropped deep to receive the ball and pull Gago out of position while Götze drifted to the left to fill the vacated space. In response, Özil and Müller swapped attacking positions to allow the latter to drift into a more central position. From there, the player's naturally assumed one another's roles with Müller dropping off from the defensive line, pulling Demichelis out to cover for the overstretched midfield and opening the fatal gap that allowed Götze to slip in from the left flank and receive Schürrle's cross unopposed.

In the end, Germany had come full circle in terms of their gradual and ultimately circular stylistic evolution throughout the tournament. They had started with a more progressive 4-1-4-1 with a roaming attacking trio comprised of Özil, Müller and Götze. This was to be the bold and innovative identity of Germany's golden generation, the Germany of 2014 and beyond. Yet, this approach had proven uncertain and inconsistent against more disciplined and physical opposition, and by the quarterfinals, Löw had reverted to a hybrid of his 2010 and 2014 approaches with Klose operating as a traditional striker in place of a drifting, creative forward. There was an immensely satisfying narrative quality, then, to the character of this final goal. Götze, coming off the bench as Germany's prodigal son, returned to assert the birthright of the young Germans as the subtle creativity and movement of his unorthodox forward play did what his more traditional counterpart could not. The experience of the old guard may have reliably guided them through the final, but it took the vision and ingenuity of the neue welle to actually win it.

To model the initial system in Football Manager, the German set-up was similar to those posted earlier. The team instructions would be a Fluid/Counter 4-1-4-1 with "Shorter Passing," "Push Higher Up," "Work Ball Into Box" and "Roam from Positions."

The individual roles would be:

GK: Sweeper Keeper - Defend

DL: Fullback - Attack + Cross Less Often + Cross from Byline

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Wingback - Support

DM: Deep Lying Playmaker - Defend

ML: Wide Midfielder - Support + Cross Less Often

MCL: Deep Lying Playmaker - Support + Shoot More Often

MCR: Central Midfielder - Attack + Mark Tigheter + Fewer Risky Passes

MR: Wide Midfielder - Attack + More Risky Passes

STC: Deep Lying Forward - Support + Move Into Channels

ti5EiUb.png

With the introduction of Schürrle, Özil would take up a roaming support duty in the centre with Schurrle operating in an attack duty on the left flank. The introduction of Götze would signal a switch from a Deep Lying Forward to a more mobile and expressive Complete Forward.

ubRVCl2.png

ARGENTINA

While Sabella had clearly made a strategic decision to cede control of the midfield to the Germans, Argentina did not simply look to park the bus and defend inside their own box. Rather, they sought a careful balance between disciplined, defensive solidity at the back and rapid, highly organised transitions aiming to securely work the ball to Messi's feet. This approach was commendably effective as Argentina actually managed to create nearly as many chances as the Germans. Had Higuain and Messi been slightly more clinical, the Argentines could easily have made the game far more uncomfortable for the Germans.

The initial system was based on a 4-4-1-1 defensive shape with Messi drifting about just ahead of the midfield. Attacks were fast but meticulously controlled with the team reluctant to break forward en masse. Instead, counterattacks were carefully focused down the right with Lavezzi bursting forward quickly to link up with Messi and Higuain while Enzo Perez sat deeper to occasionally help Mascherano move the ball out of defence. Zabaleta, similarly, played a very reserved role and, aside from a few early overlapping runs, was focused on neutralising the threat of Özil (and later, Schürrle).

XXw9B8k.png

Sabella was clearly concerned with preserving the team's shape, but even then, he was not afraid to take risks to push for the win. At the half, Aguero was brought on and the team switched to a 4-3-1-2 diamond system. This ensured Messi always had an additional attacker ahead of him, but poor individual performances from Aguero and Higuain meant there was no actual reward for the increased stress placed upon the midfield. Still, Mascherano and Biglia did their best to stave off the German attacks, but fatigue and lack of support from the forward three eventually gave the Germans the opportunity they needed to avoid a shootout.

For the starting system, I would use a Rigid fluidity and Standard mentality. I chose Rigid because the team's attacks were highly structured with the defence primarily concerned with holding shape as the midfield looked to supply chances for Higuain. A Standard mentality was chosen to reflect their tendency to attack in a more methodical manner, moving the ball forward quickly but not committing midfielders and fullbacks forward until the Germans dropped back to deal with Messi. The Argentine defending was also fairly aggressive despite the fact that they dropped very deep. To reflect thieir low block, I would add the team instructions "Much Deeper Defensive Line," and to represent the speed of their attack and the emphasis on keeping the ball on the ground for Messi's benefit, I would also add "Much Higher Tempo" and "Shorter Passing."

For individual roles:

GK: Goalkeeper - Defend

DL: Fullback - Attack

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Fullback - Support

ML: Wide Midfielder - Support + Cross Less Often + Sit Narrower + Shoot Less Often + Less Risky Passes

MCL: Deep Lying Playmaker - Defend + Cross Less Often

MCR: Central Midfielder - Defend

MR: Winger - Attack

AMC: Trequartista - Attack + Shoot More Often + Dribble More

STC: Advanced Forward - Attack + Move Into Channels

NefSw1V.png

For the system used after the first half, switch to a 4-3-1-2 with the ML switched to a Central Midfielder (Support) and the MR switched to a Complete Forward (Support) with a personal instruction to "Move Into Channels."

lsFAmUc.png

THOG - Could I ask why you use Counter with push higher up. I always thought it is best to use Counter with a deep defensive line.

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THOG - Could I ask why you use Counter with push higher up. I always thought it is best to use Counter with a deep defensive line.

Because they were cautious on the ball but still held a fairly high line.

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THOG - When deploying deep def. line (in this case even very deep def. line), how to deal with that space in front of the defence? I found that with playing 4-4-2 flat or 4-4-1-1 I have never gotten that to work without fairly high def. line (or moving MCs to DMC spots).

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THOG - When deploying deep def. line (in this case even very deep def. line), how to deal with that space in front of the defence? I found that with playing 4-4-2 flat or 4-4-1-1 I have never gotten that to work without fairly high def. line (or moving MCs to DMC spots).

I don't think there's anything particularly wrong with flat midfields. The space in front of the defence is a weakness, but it's always a question of balancing that weakness with the benefits you get from playing someone elsewhere and the likelihood that the opposition will actually make productive use of that space.

Germany's goal was itself a result of this weakness. Argentina's midfield was pulled forward, requiring Demichelis to chase Müller and expose the space that Götze attacked. It's a real risk when playing this system, but it's a risk accepted to give you benefits elsewhere.

As I've been saying recently, formation is just a tool that I think people tend to overlook. There seems to be a sense that your formation is like the bedrock of your entire footballing ideology (for example, "This will be my 4231 save"), but it's really just one of many tools at your disposal and I don't think many managers IRL are really that committed to using a specific defensive system. It's about finding the right balance for the players you have and the team you're facing whereas your general style of play is something you can adapt to all kinds of different formations. Just be attentive and proactive, if that area is causing problems, move a player to DM; if it's not, you can probably use that player better somewhere else.

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Thank you THOG for all the work you have done in creating the graphics and diagrams to help us understand football tactics and FM better. I appreciate the tactical insight you have shown in this thread and especially the time and effort in analyzing games and depicting them tactically on FM14. I now have a better appreciation of WMs and what they can do. Hope we will see a similar thread on the upcoming EPL season if time permits on your side=)

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I was woundering if you are planning to do something like this for league or champions league games? I would definetly read all of your analysis and i think it would be helpful, so i am all for it :)

thanks for all the world cup analysis!

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Thanks a bunch! Its been inspiring to read all of you interpretations. This with your other Tactic topics have made FM14 a much more enjoyable game as I understand the ME better than before.

Please continue this with the UCL/UEL, if you have the time!

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COLOMBIA

The match between Colombia and Uruguay was more like what you normally expect from two sides that naturally prefer to play on the transition: both teams sitting fairly deep and patiently moving the ball through midfield in the hope that a lapse in concentration or a moment of magic will lead to a breakthrough. For Colombia, that moment of magic was once again provided by another quietly brilliant performance by James Rodriguez while Uruguay once again were left devoid of ideas in the absence of their own, notably more troubled magician. However, Rodriguez's effectiveness has come largely from Colombia's willingness not to force an over-eager sense of dependence upon him. Rodriguez is not a playmaker in the sense of being an ever-present and defining influence on the flow of Colombia's play. In fact, he's quite the opposite. The rest of the Colombian team seems more than happy to ignore Rodriguez for long stretches of play, and this allows him to drift silently into widening spaces and evade the attention of defenders before suddenly springing forward with an explosive strike or deft pass.

Complementing Rodriguez perfectly in this match, Cuadrado played a similar role in an entirely different fashion. He was flamboyant, distracting and assertive as he darted furiously across the midfield, eventually setting up the second goal with a selfless headed pass to the feet of a stalking Rodriguez. Around these two players, Jose Pekerman provided a well structured system that helped stretch a deep-lying Uruguayan defence on all sides. The midfielders Aguilar and Sanchez sat deeper to control play through a disciplined double pivot, the fullbacks Zuniga and Armero linked the teams two distinct halves through the flanks, and up front, Martinez and Gutierrez worked tirelessly to open gaps in Uruguay's stubborn backline.

OloCHUO.png

In terms of shape, Colombia demonstrated a remarkable amount of flexibility while never really changing their style of play. With each goal, Colombia made adjustments to solidify their defence without compromising the basic structure of their attack. At the outset, Colombia lined up in a 4-3-1-2 with Rodriguez remaining central to provide a quick link to the strikers. In the group stages, Colombia mainly played a 4-4-1-1 with Rodriguez operating in the middle, but with Uruguay likely to use the 5-3-2 that secured the controversial victory against Italy, Pekerman likely wanted to start with two strikers without moving Rodriguez out of the position in which he's proven so effective.

After the first goal, bolstering the defence took priority, and Colombia transitioned to more of a 4-4-2 (and at times, an asymmetric 4-3-3) with Cuadrado and Rodriguez switching flanks and roaming centrally as a pair of interiores. After the second goal and the substitution of Gutierrez, the shape became a 5-4-1, but even as the basic system became more defensive, Uruguay never found a foothold to put the Colombians under any sustained pressure. Whereas formation is often thought of as a pivotal and defining aspect of a tactical system, this was a brilliant display in how formation can be freely adjusted to avoid dramatically altering a team's approach.

nqX7wJy.png

For the tactic, I will focus on Colombia's initial approach leading up to the first goal. The 4-4-2 that was used later in the match can't quite be replicated without a truly free-roaming wide role, though you can roughly approximate it by using wide midfielders or a wide midfielder with an inside forward (as Rodriguez did not always track back). The initial set-up, on the other hand, can be created quite easily.

The initial shape, as noted above, was a 4-3-1-2. For the fluidity setting, I would go with Fluid. The team had two distinct units with the six more defensive players providing a disciplined foundation for the free-flowing attack. While the two wide defenders had aggressive roles, they were hesitant to just bomb forward and mainly functioned as linking players on the flanks. No further team instructions are necessary, though if you use the 4-4-2 variant, you should set "Allow Wide Players to Swap."

For individual roles:

GK: Goalkeeper - Defend

DL: Wingback - Support

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Wingback - Attack

MCL: Central Midfielder - Defend

MC: Deep-Lying Playmaker - Support

MCR: Box-to-Box Midfielder - Support + Dribble More

AMC: Attacking Midfielder - Support + Run Wide with Ball + Roam from Position

STCL: Deep-Lying Forward - Support + Run Wide with Ball

STCR: Advanced Forward - Attack + Move Into Channels

KiFkvGs.png

Alternately, you can set them up as a 4-4-2 with the AMC and MCR switched to:

ML: Wide Midfielder - Support + Sit Narrower + Roam from Position + Cut Inside (or use AML: Inside Forward - Support + Sit Narrower + Roam from Position)

MR: Wide Midfielder - Support + Sit Narrower + Roam from Position + Dribble More

Finally, for the late match 5-4-1, the advanced forward would be replaced with a third central defender.

Hey,

Please can you (or anyone else :D) explain why you went for 'Counter' and 'Fluid' for Colombia?

Personally my interpretation would be Attacking & Balanced; perhaps with shorter passing.

I am really struggling to get my head around mentalities and fluidity at the moment... :(

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GERMANY

The Germans cruised (Kroosed?) to a routine victory with a slight change of system as France withdrew from the attacking approach that had comfortably carried them to the quarterfinals. The German system was somewhat similar to the one France has been using. There were two key changes from the Müller/Lahm-centric approach of earlier games. The first was the replacement of Götze with Miroslav Klose who offered the qualities of a more traditional centre forward. Özil started on the left as the spearhead of the team's creative flank with Kroos offering close support and Müller operating on the right in his trademark role as a lurking wide poacher.

In deeper positions, the other key change was Schweinsteiger's reintroduction as the midfield controller while Khedira took on a slightly more conservative role with Klose now providing a muscular aerial threat in the box. Defending on the flanks, Lahm mainly sat back to shield space behind the drifting Müller as Höwedes attempted the occasional overlap on the more active left flank.

CdKSoX1.png

Thanks to a relatively early goal, the German attack was never forced to press its luck. The French defended deep and paid the price quickly. This allowed the Germans to maintain the rhythm of their early, methodical approach and steer the match to a comfortable conclusion as Deschamps proceeded through a series of minor and ultimately ineffective tactical adjustments.

In terms of team instructions, the system was otherwise fairly similar to what we've seen earlier in the tournament. Fluid/Counter 4-1-4-1 with "Shorter Passing," "Push Higher Up," "Work Ball Into Box" and "Roam from Positions." I would also add "Play Wider" as the Germans looked to stretch the French midfield and exploit the space that their 4-3-3 exposes on the flanks.

For individual roles:

GK: Sweeper Keeper - Defend

DL: Fullback - Attack + Cross Less Often + Cross from Byline

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Fullback - Support

DM: Deep Lying Playmaker - Defend

ML: Wide Midfielder - Support + Cross Less Often

MCL: Central Midfielder - Support + Run Wide with Ball

MCR: Box to Box Midfielder - Support

MR: Wide Midfielder - Attack + More Risky Passes + Cross Less Often

STC: Deep Lying Forward - Support + Move Into Channels

2Xa22JE.png

hi, I wanna ask several question.sorry if this seem silly question,Im still a newbie who learning a tactic

1.DL

this is howedes position,right? why he is fb attack?and cross from byline I almost never see him do overlaping and do crossing

2.wide midfield

why none are in advanced position? do mueller and ozil play as wide midfield?

and also, I know u arent german coach.but just asking ur opinion. why they dont put mueller as inside forward in left position,and oezil on right winger, so they have 2 inverted winger?

things also happen at france,why dont swapping griezman and valbuena?

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Counter will be fast paced and attacking if the opposition is coming at you, but Colombia would tend to keep the ball in deeper positions if that wasn't happening. Against Uruguay, Colombia were up against a very defensive opponent, so they took a more patient approach. I chose Fluid because:

(a) There wasn't a clear goal-scoring focal point in the attack. The attacking four were looking to create space/chances for one another with Rodriguez not really being a playmaker (at least, not in the sense that Colombia were actively looking to funnel everything through him). The fact that Rodriguez likes to shoot a lot is also a reason he shouldn't be interpreted as a playmaker since playmaker roles look for the pass as opposed to shooting from distance.

(b) The two holding mids were very deep and cautious relative to the more attacking mids.

© The wingbacks were tending to be more cautious and check their runs, especially for a system that was otherwise fairly narrow.

(d) While there was a clear separation between the attacking and defensive units, there wasn't an obvious separation of responsibility in either unit. Colombia's attacks weren't methodical and strictly structured. Each player was a potential creator/goal-scorer.

As always, fluidity is open to interpretation. This is how things looked to my eyes, but you may want to emphasise different qualities that I possibly overlooked.

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hi, I wanna ask several question.sorry if this seem silly question,Im still a newbie who learning a tactic

1.DL

this is howedes position,right? why he is fb attack?and cross from byline I almost never see him do overlaping and do crossing

2.wide midfield

why none are in advanced position? do mueller and ozil play as wide midfield?

and also, I know u arent german coach.but just asking ur opinion. why they dont put mueller as inside forward in left position,and oezil on right winger, so they have 2 inverted winger?

things also happen at france,why dont swapping griezman and valbuena?

He won't cross a lot. Telling him to Cross from the Byline effectively tells him to avoid attempting early crosses and that is combined with a PI telling him to Cross Less. He did get forward quite often to provide width, pull off Özil's marker and allow him to drift more freely.

The wide players are not in an advanced position because Germany's midfield defended in a 1-4, not a 1-2. They didn't use inverted wingers because they weren't overly concerned with just having them cut in and shoot. That approach can end up being very predictable and teams don't have a lot of trouble defending against it if they sit deep and narrow, especially if the players in question don't possess much of a long shot. Germany's attack was based more on overloading the wide areas and looking to work the ball across into any central spaces it created. The tournament was won by a well constructed cross in the end.

Griezmann normally plays on the left wing. He's comfortable there and has no problem scoring goals based on his off the ball movement, so there wasn't any reason to make him an inverted winger. Valbuena's role was to draw the defence over to his flank and create space for the other two forwards. Having him just always drive into the middle would pull the defence central and defeat the entire function of his role. Generally, I think the use of "inside forward"-type players is overestimated. There are still plenty of wide players whose job is to actually operate in a wide area.

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interesting. whenever I play FM, i always put playmaker type of player on opossite wing of his preffered foot.maybe this caused my tactic too easy to read by enemy. Those kind of things inspire me some point

btw, for germany set up, yu say they are overloading wide areas? then how about end product,while they dont have klose, who good in the air?

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interesting. whenever I play FM, i always put playmaker type of player on opossite wing of his preffered foot.maybe this caused my tactic too easy to read by enemy. Those kind of things inspire me some point

btw, for germany set up, yu say they are overloading wide areas? then how about end product,while they dont have klose, who good in the air?

They went back to Klose for that reason, but early on, they had Khedira venturing very far forward to provide a more muscular presence alongside Götze and Müller.

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Ok I understand. so playing wide player for wide player would not suit for team that dont have anybody with good air ability. but if have box to box player, it still useful.So this system may not suit for barcelona

how about belgium ? Im so interesting about belgium. especially their midfield combination, and right wing, so I may could understand their decision to not play adnan janusac. also, I wanna know,at final 10 minute againts argentina, what role for van buyten,as he go forward very high on the pitch.still he an cd or he as ST.

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Ok I understand. so playing wide player for wide player would not suit for team that dont have anybody with good air ability. but if have box to box player, it still useful.So this system may not suit for barcelona

Not necessarily. You can bring the ball out wide and try to create spaces in the middle for cutbacks that more technical players can exploit if you lack an aerial threat. Barcelona typically use a predominantly right-footed player on the right to link up with Alves, force the opposition to shift over and then dribble/pass from a very deep flank position with the intention of carrying out combination play inside the area (in which case, the inside of their stronger foot is typically positioned to pass as opposed to shoot). Pedro and Sanchez both do this. It is very likely that this is how they'll use Suarez as well. You will want to tell the wide mid or wide forward to cross less to encourage them to keep the ball on the ground (do not mistake "Drill Crosses" for low crosses, this just encourages players to hit crosses harder, not lower).

how about belgium ? Im so interesting about belgium. especially their midfield combination, and right wing, so I may could understand their decision to not play adnan janusac. also, I wanna know,at final 10 minute againts argentina, what role for van buyten,as he go forward very high on the pitch.still he an cd or he as ST.

He was repositioned as a striker with Alderweireld moved into central defence and I believe de Bruyne playing as a wingback. Van Buyten was a striker throughout the early part of his professional career, so it's not unusual for him to be played as a striker when needed. In this case, he would probably be best represented as an attack duty Deep Lying Forward.

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(do not mistake "Drill Crosses" for low crosses, this just encourages players to hit crosses harder, not lower).

Huh, you learn something every day, thanks, I will stop using that TI for that reason then! :thup:

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THOG, i was looking through this thread again for some inspiration and chanced upon Portugal's formation against Germany as outlined by you in this post and noted that Ronaldo was in an ML position.In your opinion, how would you instruct the ML to play like Ronaldo? I am thinking along the lines of further forward, roam from position plus specifically marking the DCR to encourage the kind of pseudo-striker movement that Ronaldo is fond of. Great to see you back in this thread contributing your ideas again THOG=)

Germany Mini-Update

The scoreline may suggest the sort of emphatic evisceration that knocked out England and Argentina in 2010, but this was a relatively subdued and cautious performance from the Germans. In FM terms, this was a terrific example of a fluid structure in action with a more patient and disciplined defensive unit looking to support a more adventurous, free-flowing quartet of versatile attacking talent. Muller led the line in his usual role as an ever-present hunter of space, shifting from side to side to support creative wide men who looked to receive the ball out wide and work it into the box with clever combination play. With Klose now 36, the Germans lack an obvious choice to play the traditional centre forward in Löw's system, so Khedira was tasked with bursting forward to provide the physical presence that the three young creators lacked. Though Kroos and Lahm acted as a double pivot, Löw took extra precaution against the threat Ronaldo could pose to either flank and opted for two central defenders to protect space behind Özil and Götze. With Ronaldo operating down the Germans' right, Boateng naturally ended up with the more cautious role while the right-footed Howedes did his best to provide width and a close range outlet for Götze on the left.

SM7MybQ.png

In defence, the Germans were very disciplined with Özil and Götze consistently tracking back into deep positions to restrict as much space as possible and cut off every possible path to Ronaldo, but with Khedira typically dropping back next to Kroos in a 4-1-4-1 shape, this often left Muller isolated and forced him to drift back close to the trio of central midfielders. This blunted Germany's ability to transition quickly on the break, but with the Portuguese defence making a series of dire errors, the Germans ended up not having to wait for a breakthrough from open play. This isn't to say the Germans were poor though. Aside from a few early errors at the back, they were thoroughly competent, but Portugal never required them to be anything more.

y9MCXCF.png

For the tactic, I would consider this a Fluid/Counter 4-1-4-1 with the TIs "Shorter Passing," "Work Ball Into Box" and "Push Higher Up." And the individual roles:

GK: Sweeper Keeper - Defend + Distribute to Defenders

DL: Fullback - Attack + Cross Less Often + Cross from Byline

DCL: Central Defender - Defend

DCR: Central Defender - Defend

DR: Fullback - Support

DM: Defensive Midfielder - Defend

MCL: Deep Lying Playmaker - Support

MCR: Central Midfielder - Attack + Less Risky Passes

ML: Wide Midfielder - Attack + Dribble More + More Risky Passes + Cross Less Often + Roam from Position + Cut Inside

MR: Wide Midfielder - Attack + Dribble More + More Risky Passes + Cross Less Often + Roam from Position

With Boateng sitting deeper to guard against the threat of Ronaldo, Özil made more varied use of the space on his flank, so I would not recommend instructing this player to 'Cut Inside.'

ST: Complete Forward - Support + Move Into Channels

pLmihFg.png

As you can see in the following image, when you combine roaming and attack duties, you do not necessarily need "Cut Inside" to make a player move up and inside as a second forward. In my opinion, the question is really whether it's a priority for the player to move inside to encourage an attacking fullback to move forward:

S0FVxkU.png

And here, you can see how this 4-1-4-1 assumes more of a 4-2-3-1 shape in the initial press:

6ZFRtPy.png

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Not necessarily. You can bring the ball out wide and try to create spaces in the middle for cutbacks that more technical players can exploit if you lack an aerial threat. Barcelona typically use a predominantly right-footed player on the right to link up with Alves, force the opposition to shift over and then dribble/pass from a very deep flank position with the intention of carrying out combination play inside the area (in which case, the inside of their stronger foot is typically positioned to pass as opposed to shoot). Pedro and Sanchez both do this. It is very likely that this is how they'll use Suarez as well. You will want to tell the wide mid or wide forward to cross less to encourage them to keep the ball on the ground (do not mistake "Drill Crosses" for low crosses, this just encourages players to hit crosses harder, not lower).

so,about crossing/passing from wide in Barcelona, alves is cwb with cross less, and pedro/alexis is a winger? and the TI dont use drill crosses?thanks. its a great lesson. Anyway, if drill crosses is for harder crosses, will it suit to tall player who also quick? do portugal use this option to cross ronaldo?

He was repositioned as a striker with Alderweireld moved into central defence and I believe de Bruyne playing as a wingback. Van Buyten was a striker throughout the early part of his professional career, so it's not unusual for him to be played as a striker when needed. In this case, he would probably be best represented as an attack duty Deep Lying Forward.

so many attacking player become wing back,altought if it happen in FM, they would receive red dot. like wijnaldum in dutch (while facing mexico, kuyt is on high up in the pitch,while wijnaldum cover the right position) also this is the bruyne. they are playmaker, do in all out attack position, they do not need playmaker but extra attacker, so bring the playmaker to wing back, and the wing back/center back be a strikers?

I read more details today,and noticed that wide midfield become so popular now.why this role more popular than winger? because we could instruct more to player, or there something hidden I dont know?

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