Formations: From the 4-4-2 to the 4-5-1 to the W-M, and Back Again.

[SCIAG]

Ah, I see. So, in effect, it just makes attacking through the middle pointless, and strengthens the incentive to attack down the wings.

I think "lesser" 4-5-1 variants (those used in the lower leagues) generally tend to be 2+1, but with, in FM terms, 2 MCs and an AMC, rather than the two DMs Liverpool use. In attack, the AMC gets ahead and supports the striker, ideally taking up the postions expected of a Dalglish-type player. Mind you, proper DMs are showing up a lot more, so 1+2 is likely to increase in usage, especially amongst the younger managers. Anyway, in attack a 2+1 (4-4-1-1/4-2-3-1- basically the same thing!) is effectively a 4-4-2. I really haven't seen a great deal of 1+2 other than Chelsea, Barcelona and Bolton, so I don't feel confident in making a judgment on it.

Ultimately, that's going to happen with any formation. Either you'll be like-for-like with the opponent (W-M, 4-4-2), your formations will cancel each other out (4-1-4-1 against 4-4-1-1), or both teams will be overrun in some areas (let's say a 5-2-2-1 with defensive midfielders and wingers against a 3-6-1... never happens, but you get the point!). Formations, strategies and shapes are ultimately a choice between those options. 5-3-2 was popular because it left a spare man in midfield and in defence against a 4-4-2, but vulnerable on the wings. If you think your wing backs are good enough, and the "spare" midfielder is creative enough, you go for it.

[redmark]

I have never said they are "modern innovations" or that there is anything fundamentally unique in any of Fergusons lineups, I was attempting to explain the reasons behind Fergusons tactical evolution over the last decade or so as I understood them. The driving factors are clearly European and then Domestic issues, but there must be reasons as to why the evolution of the side took that particular route. And I am not writing a book here. If you wish to go into detail on 4-4-2 before Fergusons 1999 side you are welcome to do so, but don't expect me cover every possible historical tactical issue prior to the conclusion to a particular ten year trend. This thread was never about the 4-4-2 prior to 1999.

Infact most of you seem to be completely missing the point, which is the reasons underlying the pattern of change seen at United from 1999 to 2010 and a look at the strengths and weaknesses of the 4-5-1 that are at the heart of that change. Issues none of you have discussed remotely, and issues that are the very core of my original posts.

:shrug:

That wasn't the gist of your OP. I quoted it directly, where you suggested that the original English successes - not limited to United, in your post - were built on physical supremacy. They were not. That English clubs played a simple, unsubtle, 442. They did not. That the tactical evolution of Ferguson and United somehow tell us something about English football in general. It does not.

I'm not trying to pee on your parade, just pointing out that I think you're overstating the case based on too limited a perspective. The recent tactical flexibility displayed by Ferguson seems more significant, dramatic and important if you misunderstand the history of English football, as I think you have. As an exploration of United's tactical evolution under Ferguson that's fine, but you seem to be drawing more significant conclusions than it warrants and with a tone that perhaps grates for non-United fans who may feel they're being taught to suck eggs. Essentially, Ferguson has become more tactically flexible/fluid as he's got older; but many teams have been doing this sort of thing for a long time.

Anyway... I think a discussion of United's tactical evolution can be interesting, but the tone reminds me of the Sky generation football-was-invented-in-the-90s. Sorry if I've misunderstood your intent, but I feel any misunderstanding stems from your own hyperbole.

[higgins]

:shrug:

That wasn't the gist of your OP. I quoted it directly, where you suggested that the original English successes - not limited to United, in your post - were built on physical supremacy. They were not. That English clubs played a simple, unsubtle, 442. They did not. That the tactical evolution of Ferguson and United somehow tell us something about English football in general. It does not.

I'm not trying to pee on your parade, just pointing out that I think you're overstating the case based on too limited a perspective. The recent tactical flexibility displayed by Ferguson seems more significant, dramatic and important if you misunderstand the history of English football, as I think you have. As an exploration of United's tactical evolution under Ferguson that's fine, but you seem to be drawing more significant conclusions than it warrants and with a tone that perhaps grates for non-United fans who may feel they're being taught to suck eggs. Essentially, Ferguson has become more tactically flexible/fluid as he's got older; but many teams have been doing this sort of thing for a long time.

Anyway... I think a discussion of United's tactical evolution can be interesting, but the tone reminds me of the Sky generation football-was-invented-in-the-90s. Sorry if I've misunderstood your intent, but I feel any misunderstanding stems from your own hyperbole.

That was what I meant when I talked about narrow minded knowledge of football, Sir Alex Ferguson won't be probably remembered for his tactical experiments and/or innovations, cause he didn't invent anything.

As I said only a football fan with a very fervid imagination could see W-M traces looking at Ferguson's Manchester United, that's the reason why I tend to consider SFraser posts in this thread as a narcissistic and a bit confused exercise, basically it's football through a keyhole.

I realized that some people could find this interesting, not me, cause under the wannabe-Jonathan Wilson hood, there's nothing.

[SFraser]

Ah, I see. So, in effect, it just makes attacking through the middle pointless, and strengthens the incentive to attack down the wings.

That's not entireally true. What happens is that the pattern of attacking space changes and so do the lines of attack.

Take Mourinhos Chelsea and Barcelona of the past two seasons. They are pretty much text book examples of how to attack a 4-5-1. Two advanced central midfielders getting into the gaps of the opponents 3 man central midfield, two Inside Forwards getting into the gaps between Centreback and Fullback, a single Striker capable of exploiting marking confusion and also posing a very dangerous threat through individual ability.

The absolute root and source and fundamental issue is the space occupied by these two advanced central midfielders. The space they occupy is the key attacking space. Those two spaces are the entire pivot around which the threat of potent attacking 4-5-1's revolves. The importance of that space is created by the defensive structure of a 4-5-1 and is ruthlessly exploited by aggressive 4-5-1s in their attacking shape. The space where Cristiano Ronaldo is the most dangerous striker on the planet, where Xavi and Iniesta the most dangerous playmakers on the planet, where Wayne Rooney shows all that "appreciation of space" and Gerrard wins matches with thunderbolts or runs from deep, where Lampard is "the best English midfielder of the decade" and where Deco is so "cunning and clever". How many shots has Darren Gibson had from the Inside Right position in the last few weeks? How many goals this season? How many from Fletcher exploiting these gaps this season? How many goals has Gerrard scored in the past 5 years from this position? How many has Ronaldo scored?

And it is that mis-match between the 4-5-1 in defence and in attack that is the source of the inherant problem in the 4-5-1. It should be an incredibly defensively strong formation and it very often is, untill you come up against quality players in the W shaped attacking 5. That shape with supporting fullbacks will rip through all but the most resolute of defensive 4-5-1s. Wingers drilling in tracking back, dual DM's drilled in maintaining position and spotting the crucial threat as it develops, flat back fours drilled in switching from marking 3 + sweeper to marking 3 + closing down midfield gaps.

The W shaped attacking 5 is lethal to a flatback 4 and midfield 3.

The Benitez system has the above mentioned level of tactical drilling and this level of drill is very likely one of the major reasons Benitez refuses to adapt his formation in the Premier League. The two DM's occupy the space between midfield and defence, patrol those very specific crucial channels, and the midfield itself is incredibly hard working, aggressive and has immense stamina. The three midfielders that support Torres are tasked with disrupting buildup inside the Liverpool half in key zones, the two wide positions and the position that the opponents DM might try to occupy. The two DM's are drilled in preventing play developing in those key channels that they sit in directly. It is very rare to see either of them leave those zones.

The major features of Liverpool in recent years have been their defensive strength, Steven Gerrard the single handed match winner, and Fernando Torres the goalscorer extraordinaire. The immense defensive strength of the Liverpool system combined to the general player quality is matched by the immense offensive weakness of the system and the specific player quality. The sacrifice made for the defensive system is the attacking system, but then Gerrard and Torres have the ability. Up untill this season the Liverpool play has been as clear as day and incredibly but not unexpectedly effective. It is telling that Liverpool have been prevented from reaching more finals by Chelsea, who possessed immense physical strength and equally rigourous and indepth tactical drilling, and more quality over the entire pitch.

These are clear tactical battlegrounds in top level football in recent years. Barcelona, United, Chelsea and Liverpool are not independant phenomena and they did not stumble upon their individual 4-5-1 tactical preferences by luck, chance, or Domestic football alone. These teams do not ply their preferred trade in the league and then go for random defensive formations when they meet each other in the European Cup. These are teams at the cutting edge of modern football tactical evolution, locked in direct tactical competition with each other, with the lessons learned from matches between each other and against others used to defeat domestic teams and battle for domestic titles.

What I am trying to explain in this thread is the pattern of tactical evolution and the strengths and weaknesses of what was seen in the past that lead to further evolution. Todays formations are direct answers to last seasons failures or last seasons successes or last seasons realisations. Barcelona did not swap Eto'o and 40 million for Ibrahimovic for nothing.

The crucial area of fundamental tactical detail that has come out of the last few years of top level football is not the emergence of Messi and Ronaldo as lethal wingers following on from the route shown by Henry. That is old news, but old news many around here still have never read and have no idea about. The recent news, the important news is the fundamental importance of the dual AMCs. Defending against dual AMCs and attacking with dual AMCs is the crux of recent tactical issues. Barcelona have decided to deal with their poor form against English sides in the European Cup by combining their peerless dual AMCs with a single striker that is closer to a Trequartista than a Striker, in the hope of posing unsolvable puzzles for defences. United are moving towards a central midfield system of 2 DM's and 2 AMC's using their tucking in Left Winger and Deep Dropping RCF in the attempt to replicate what Barcelona have behind the Striker while dealing with the defensive problem of dual AMCs that the Benitez system is designed to solve.

You can ofcourse ignore all of this, call me hyperbolic and verbose, and question my knowledge of football. You could pick me up on the fine details of the entireally generic and completely glossed over minor introduction for my original post, but perhaps you might just read what I have said here and bother to engage me in discussion on those issues, the contemporary issues, the issues that were the point of this post in the first place.

That was what I meant when I talked about narrow minded knowledge of football, Sir Alex Ferguson won't be probably remembered for his tactical experiments and/or innovations, cause he didn't invent anything.

As I said only a football fan with a very fervid imagination could see W-M traces looking at Ferguson's Manchester United, that's the reason why I tend to consider SFraser posts in this thread as a narcissistic and a bit confused exercise, basically it's football through a keyhole.

I realized that some people could find this interesting, not me, cause under the wannabe-Jonathan Wilson hood, there's nothing.

Ironic that you should mention narcissism, but could you spam one of the plethora of your own tactical threads? A few of us are trying to have a discussion here and your 10+ self congratulatory posts interspersed by Latin phrases are becoming distracting.

[redmark]

You can ofcourse ignore all of this, call me hyperbolic and verbose, and question my knowledge of football. You could pick me up on the fine details of the entireally generic and completely glossed over minor introduction for my original post, but perhaps you might just read what I have said here and bother to engage me in discussion on those issues, the contemporary issues, the issues that were the point of this post in the first place.

Ok, I'll try to do so: though, as I'm going to have to point out, this very post contains (at least) one of the most hyperbolic statements of the thread so far .

I want to deal with the bits about the Benitez system first, because a) it's the one I have more interest in and knowledge of, and b) I think your summary of it reveals a basic gap in the argument you're putting forward.

The Benitez system has the above mentioned level of tactical drilling and this level of drill is very likely one of the major reasons Benitez refuses to adapt his formation in the Premier League. The two DM's occupy the space between midfield and defence, patrol those very specific crucial channels, and the midfield itself is incredibly hard working, aggressive and has immense stamina. The three midfielders that support Torres are tasked with disrupting buildup inside the Liverpool half in key zones, the two wide positions and the position that the opponents DM might try to occupy. The two DM's are drilled in preventing play developing in those key channels that they sit in directly. It is very rare to see either of them leave those zones.

The major features of Liverpool in recent years have been their defensive strength, Steven Gerrard the single handed match winner, and Fernando Torres the goalscorer extraordinaire. The immense defensive strength of the Liverpool system combined to the general player quality is matched by the immense offensive weakness of the system and the specific player quality. The sacrifice made for the defensive system is the attacking system, but then Gerrard and Torres have the ability. Up untill this season the Liverpool play has been as clear as day and incredibly but not unexpectedly effective. It is telling that Liverpool have been prevented from reaching more finals by Chelsea, who possessed immense physical strength and equally rigourous and indepth tactical drilling, and more quality over the entire pitch.

There are two main, related, problems with this analysis - the bolded bits highlighting some of the indicators.

Firstly, "immense offensive weakness"? Based on what - statistics, or accepted cliched wisdom? Liverpool were the quickest team to 100 goals in all competitions in 07-08 and the highest scorers in the PL in 08-09. Before you think "Gerrard and Torres", shouldn't an attacking side containing Rooney and Ronaldo score more goals than a defensive side containing Gerrard and Torres? Of course it should. But then if we deduct Gerrard and Torres' league goals from last season (30) and deduct Rooney and Ronaldo's (30) - guess what? Liverpool still scored more. This isn't meant as Liverpool-United slanging, by the way: it's to point out something fundamental: Liverpool aren't a defensive side. This really shouldn't need pointing out to anyone looking to analyse tactics seriously, but apparently it does. Liverpool scored 9 goals more than United, Chelsea and Arsenal (who all scored precisely the same) last season. Yet 99% of football fans still accept the cliche that Benitez is "defensive".

Benitez can be cautious. He certainly wants his team - all of it - to work hard, to press, to deny space and time and to keep it's shape. Of course he does; his tactics are based on those of Arrigo Sacchi, who drilled his Milan team to do exactly the same. Paulo Maldini once revealed that the team eventually convinced Sacchi to ease -slightly - the pressing expected of them because they were exhausted after 3 or 4 seasons of it.

But his 'caution' is overstated in the English media. The root of it is his handling of Gerrard; which I'll come back to (briefly). The main manifestation of the overstatement is the fixation with the formation nomenclature: 4-bloody-231. This fixation leads to exaggerations (including some of the bolded statements above) which bear little relation to the way Liverpool actually play, but everything to how people assume they play. For instance, your statement that "It is very rare to see either of them leave those zones" is entirely false - though undoubtedly one that most football fans who don't actually watch Liverpool week in week out (and, unfortunately, some who do) would agree with. Unless "very rare" covers the numerous occasions per game Lucas will make a run into the box or be involved in play right on the edge of the area (whether he's generally effective at it or not is a different matter - but then it doesn't show on the highlight reels, so it doesn't exist), or the three or four times a game Mascherano is close enough to thump a 30 yard effort wide and the couple of times he'll even drift to the right to put in a cross. Even defensively, a fundamental part of their roles (Mascherano in particular) is - far from simply "preventing play developing in those key channels that they sit in directly" - covering the attacking fullbacks. The '2' is infuriating: because they 'sit' (which they don't) no deeper than most other central midfield pairings in the league.

As I said, the root - for the media - is the handling of Gerrard. Being played on the right and then behind Torres has cemented the belief that Benitez doesn't "trust" Gerrard in central midfield. There is (or was) an element of truth to this - during that first half in Istanbul Gerrard was ineffective as we were cut open by Milan. But that assumption, long formed, ignores any selection or signing that contradicts it. Benitez has signed several players to play behind the main striker - Morientes, Bellamy, Kuyt, Keane - and none have worked out in the role, for one reason or another. When Kuyt was signed, he played a good third of a season in the 'Gerrard role' (before it became such), but lacked the touch for it. Keane began his time at Anfield in the role, but it was interrupted first by injury to Torres and then by Keane's own poor form (and, it appears, poor attitude). On each of these occasions, Gerrard was played in central midfield, but moved forward when the alternative wasn't working. It's also clear that Benitez expects more offensively from his central two than sitting in front of the back four: his pursuit of Barry - at the accepted expense of Alonso - was a result of Alonso settling for the 'quarterback' role; Benitez has said more than once that he wasn't being productive enough, despite the silky passing. The mobility and additional attacking qualities of a Barry or an Aquilani do fit the Benitez system; as does a central midfield Gerrard, if and when the right 'hole' player is found.

Take Mourinhos Chelsea and Barcelona of the past two seasons. They are pretty much text book examples of how to attack a 4-5-1. Two advanced central midfielders getting into the gaps of the opponents 3 man central midfield, two Inside Forwards getting into the gaps between Centreback and Fullback, a single Striker capable of exploiting marking confusion and also posing a very dangerous threat through individual ability.

The absolute root and source and fundamental issue is the space occupied by these two advanced central midfielders. The space they occupy is the key attacking space. Those two spaces are the entire pivot around which the threat of potent attacking 4-5-1's revolves. The importance of that space is created by the defensive structure of a 4-5-1 and is ruthlessly exploited by aggressive 4-5-1s in their attacking shape. The space where Cristiano Ronaldo is the most dangerous striker on the planet, where Xavi and Iniesta the most dangerous playmakers on the planet, where Wayne Rooney shows all that "appreciation of space" and Gerrard wins matches with thunderbolts or runs from deep, where Lampard is "the best English midfielder of the decade" and where Deco is so "cunning and clever". How many shots has Darren Gibson had from the Inside Right position in the last few weeks? How many goals this season? How many from Fletcher exploiting these gaps this season? How many goals has Gerrard scored in the past 5 years from this position? How many has Ronaldo scored?

And it is that mis-match between the 4-5-1 in defence and in attack that is the source of the inherant problem in the 4-5-1. It should be an incredibly defensively strong formation and it very often is, untill you come up against quality players in the W shaped attacking 5. That shape with supporting fullbacks will rip through all but the most resolute of defensive 4-5-1s. Wingers drilling in tracking back, dual DM's drilled in maintaining position and spotting the crucial threat as it develops, flat back fours drilled in switching from marking 3 + sweeper to marking 3 + closing down midfield gaps.

The W shaped attacking 5 is lethal to a flatback 4 and midfield 3.

These are clear tactical battlegrounds in top level football in recent years. Barcelona, United, Chelsea and Liverpool are not independant phenomena and they did not stumble upon their individual 4-5-1 tactical preferences by luck, chance, or Domestic football alone. These teams do not ply their preferred trade in the league and then go for random defensive formations when they meet each other in the European Cup. These are teams at the cutting edge of modern football tactical evolution, locked in direct tactical competition with each other, with the lessons learned from matches between each other and against others used to defeat domestic teams and battle for domestic titles.

What I am trying to explain in this thread is the pattern of tactical evolution and the strengths and weaknesses of what was seen in the past that lead to further evolution. Todays formations are direct answers to last seasons failures or last seasons successes or last seasons realisations. Barcelona did not swap Eto'o and 40 million for Ibrahimovic for nothing.

The crucial area of fundamental tactical detail that has come out of the last few years of top level football is not the emergence of Messi and Ronaldo as lethal wingers following on from the route shown by Henry. That is old news, but old news many around here still have never read and have no idea about. The recent news, the important news is the fundamental importance of the dual AMCs. Defending against dual AMCs and attacking with dual AMCs is the crux of recent tactical issues. Barcelona have decided to deal with their poor form against English sides in the European Cup by combining their peerless dual AMCs with a single striker that is closer to a Trequartista than a Striker, in the hope of posing unsolvable puzzles for defences. United are moving towards a central midfield system of 2 DM's and 2 AMC's using their tucking in Left Winger and Deep Dropping RCF in the attempt to replicate what Barcelona have behind the Striker while dealing with the defensive problem of dual AMCs that the Benitez system is designed to solve.

'That space' has been the key attacking space at least since I first watched football; which was 1977. That space has not been invented by the 'new' variations of 451, and certainly not by any particular defensive weakness of the system: it has simply always existed. The space in front of a back four is the space that teams first began using the 451/4411 to exploit, with the likes of Dalglish, Eric Gates of Ipswich or later, Cantona and Bergkamp. The role of the dedicated 'DM' was a response to that, but not the only response - another is the tried and tested solution of a tight midfield four, denying space to cut off the supply (another was the 352). The idea that the single DM can then be simply circumvented by the use of two AMC's is part of the same flawed logic, I'm afraid: a rather static view of football gained by gazing at FM tactic screens, perhaps. Football is not static. If a side using a single DM allows dual AMCs to overrun them, that's not a flaw with the system per se, but with a poor implementation of it. The DM is not a magic wand that allows the rest of the midfield to saunter around without working hard defensively. Similarly, a 'flat' midfield four is also capable of disrupting a single AMC, or dual AMCs, or any other shape you care to throw at it: if it is well organised, physically capable and - crucially - able to turn the opposition around and make them work back defensively, too.

Benitez's system is not "designed to solve" a dual AMC system. It is a system he's been working on since 2001 at Valencia; a system essentially not far removed from Sacchi's or, before that, Paisley's Liverpool. Replace Lucas with Aquilani (or Gerrard) and that player is as attacking and mobile as Terry McDermott; Mascherano won't have Souness's passing range, but presses harder and probably even a little higher up the pitch. It is a system that is designed to win games. Apart from a very occasional use of 3 centre backs (generally against more direct/physical sides), Benitez does not alter his system based on what particular variety of 451/442/4231/diamond he's up against. Even for cautious, rotating Benitez, the intention is to develop a system which imposes more problems on the opposition than it faces. Against bigger spenders, it will certainly struggle at times and have to play at it's very best, but the framework is not reactive.

Of course managers will react to significant defeats by reassessing details of the system. But crucially I think this is primarily to get the very most out of their own resources; how to get the best out of Rooney in tandem with Berbatov, for instance. I don't believe that this is done with too close an eye on precisely where these 'static' gaps may or may not exist in major competitors as different as Barcelona, Arsenal, Liverpool or Chelsea. I suspect the revelation of Ronaldo has spurred Ferguson to experiment with more imaginative angles of attack, but only insofar as they suit the players at his disposal. If he had signed, for instance, Torres as he tried to, we'd be seeing a rather different (and perhaps rather more 'conventional') United.

[crouchaldinho]

Redmark - that is an excellent post and I agree with many of your conclusions.

[SCIAG]

Take Mourinhos Chelsea and Barcelona of the past two seasons. They are pretty much text book examples of how to attack a 4-5-1. Two advanced central midfielders getting into the gaps of the opponents 3 man central midfield, two Inside Forwards getting into the gaps between Centreback and Fullback, a single Striker capable of exploiting marking confusion and also posing a very dangerous threat through individual ability.

Mourinho's Chelsea were quite a different kettle of fish to Barcelona. For one, they relied much more on genuine width.

At their height, Chelsea's four wingers were:

• Arjen Robben- left footed, either wing
  
• Damien Duff- left footed, left wing
  
• Joe Cole- right footed, either wing
  
• Shaun Wright-Phillips- right footed, right wing
  

The only time they played with two "inside forwards" was when Robben was on the right and Cole on the left. Wright-Phillips ran the channels rather than genuinely cutting in. Duff wasn't the player he had been for Blackburn, or previously for Chelsea. He'd still come inside, but that season, I felt him more effective as a traditional winger. Robben also was not exclusively an inside forward. Cole effective acted as one on either flank- see how he turned three United defenders and won the title for Chelsea.

Towards the end of the next season, Chelsea played a 4-4-2 with Crespo and Drogba leading the line together. I think the intention was to partner Crespo with Shevchenko, but he refused to stay in England, so that plan disappeared. It was their best football of the season.

That's just semantics. I think it's more important to note that very few sides played 4-5-1 at the time, so the tactics weren't "4-5-1 destroying".

[Comedybegs]

Benitez can be cautious. He certainly wants his team - all of it - to work hard, to press, to deny space and time and to keep it's shape. Of course he does; his tactics are based on those of Arrigo Sacchi, who drilled his Milan team to do exactly the same. Paulo Maldini once revealed that the team eventually convinced Sacchi to ease -slightly - the pressing expected of them because they were exhausted after 3 or 4 seasons of it.

But his 'caution' is overstated in the English media. The root of it is his handling of Gerrard; which I'll come back to (briefly). The main manifestation of the overstatement is the fixation with the formation nomenclature: 4-bloody-231. This fixation leads to exaggerations (including some of the bolded statements above) which bear little relation to the way Liverpool actually play, but everything to how people assume they play. For instance, your statement that "It is very rare to see either of them leave those zones" is entirely false - though undoubtedly one that most football fans who don't actually watch Liverpool week in week out (and, unfortunately, some who do) would agree with. Unless "very rare" covers the numerous occasions per game Lucas will make a run into the box or be involved in play right on the edge of the area (whether he's generally effective at it or not is a different matter - but then it doesn't show on the highlight reels, so it doesn't exist), or the three or four times a game Mascherano is close enough to thump a 30 yard effort wide and the couple of times he'll even drift to the right to put in a cross. Even defensively, a fundamental part of their roles (Mascherano in particular) is - far from simply "preventing play developing in those key channels that they sit in directly" - covering the attacking fullbacks. The '2' is infuriating: because they 'sit' (which they don't) no deeper than most other central midfield pairings in the league.

As I said, the root - for the media - is the handling of Gerrard. Being played on the right and then behind Torres has cemented the belief that Benitez doesn't "trust" Gerrard in central midfield. There is (or was) an element of truth to this - during that first half in Istanbul Gerrard was ineffective as we were cut open by Milan. But that assumption, long formed, ignores any selection or signing that contradicts it. Benitez has signed several players to play behind the main striker - Morientes, Bellamy, Kuyt, Keane - and none have worked out in the role, for one reason or another. When Kuyt was signed, he played a good third of a season in the 'Gerrard role' (before it became such), but lacked the touch for it. Keane began his time at Anfield in the role, but it was interrupted first by injury to Torres and then by Keane's own poor form (and, it appears, poor attitude). On each of these occasions, Gerrard was played in central midfield, but moved forward when the alternative wasn't working. It's also clear that Benitez expects more offensively from his central two than sitting in front of the back four: his pursuit of Barry - at the accepted expense of Alonso - was a result of Alonso settling for the 'quarterback' role; Benitez has said more than once that he wasn't being productive enough, despite the silky passing. The mobility and additional attacking qualities of a Barry or an Aquilani do fit the Benitez system; as does a central midfield Gerrard, if and when the right 'hole' player is found.

While I agree that Sfrasers assumption that the two DM's sit and consistently occupy a space is incorrect and they might not sit as deep as he says (although they do on occasions), they are however limited central midfielders and they very rarely look to move the play forward in an attacking sense, unlike Alonso (when he was there) or how Gerrard would if he played in that position.

I dont know this for fact but you could probably count the number or goals and assists from Mascherano and Lucas on one hand (or at least one hand each) and it is this which makes the tactic more negative and defensive IMO. When you look at other midfields such as Man Utd's and look at Scholes and Fletcher/Carrick then although they still play 'fairly' deep they are much more ambitious going forward and all of them have the ability to play a defence splitting pass. Can the same be said of Lucas & Mascherano? On odd occasions maybe, but I certainly wouldnt put my house on them doing so.

Whether you want to label Benitez as cautious or defensive doesnt matter, as the point is he sets up with two 'limited' midfielders ahead of the back four (albeit with one very attacking RB when he is fit) with only 4 'creative' players against pretty much every team. The two single players that keep Liverpool in with a shout are Gerrard and probably the most clinical finisher in the business which is Torres. Without these two Liverpool will still be able to pick up points as they do have some quality in the likes of Benayoun and Kuyt etc but the team wont be able to maintain its position with hard work alone. I even remember one game this season (against Stoke I think) where Benitez played 3 CB's and 3 FB'c and 1/2 DM's in his starting 11. Yes he had injuries but he still had decent players on the bench that could have added a lot more to the starting line-up.

Against good teams Benitez's system works well as teams try and attack, they can intercept the ball and break with a lot of fluidity, pace and skill (as they did a lot last season), but against tight defensive teams they struggle especially without either Torres or Gerrard because if they dont score early they eventually run out of ideas.

[redmark]

While I agree that Sfrasers assumption that the two DM's sit and consistently occupy a space is incorrect and they might not sit as deep as he says (although they do on occasions), they are however limited central midfielders and they very rarely look to move the play forward in an attacking sense, unlike Alonso (when he was there) or how Gerrard would if he played in that position.

I dont know this for fact but you could probably count the number or goals and assists from Mascherano and Lucas on one hand (or at least one hand each) and it is this which makes the tactic more negative and defensive IMO. When you look at other midfields such as Man Utd's and look at Scholes and Fletcher/Carrick then although they still play 'fairly' deep they are much more ambitious going forward and all of them have the ability to play a defence splitting pass. Can the same be said of Lucas & Mascherano? On odd occasions maybe, but I certainly wouldnt put my house on them doing so.

Whether you want to label Benitez as cautious or defensive doesnt matter, as the point is he sets up with two 'limited' midfielders ahead of the back four (albeit with one very attacking RB when he is fit) with only 4 'creative' players against pretty much every team. The two single players that keep Liverpool in with a shout are Gerrard and probably the most clinical finisher in the business which is Torres. Without these two Liverpool will still be able to pick up points as they do have some quality in the likes of Benayoun and Kuyt etc but the team wont be able to maintain its position with hard work alone. I even remember one game this season (against Stoke I think) where Benitez played 3 CB's and 3 FB'c and 1/2 DM's in his starting 11. Yes he had injuries but he still had decent players on the bench that could have added a lot more to the starting line-up.

Against good teams Benitez's system works well as teams try and attack, they can intercept the ball and break with a lot of fluidity, pace and skill (as they did a lot last season), but against tight defensive teams they struggle especially without either Torres or Gerrard because if they dont score early they eventually run out of ideas.

I'm not going to argue that Lucas and Mascherano are top class creative players, because clearly they're not. However the limitations referred to (which I disagree with in parts here or there) illustrate that the issue is with these two particular players, not the system. You compare them to Alonso - who played in that some position (Alonso was consistently the deeper of the two, whoever he partnered). Note, Alonso had very few assists either: contrary to hindsight opinion, he wasn't hitting defence splitting balls to Torres every game. He would - as Lucas and Mascherano do - keep us ticking over, maintaining possession, looking for a quick release to Gerrard, Torres or one of the wide players when it was on. Lucas does play similarly with positive passing - and far more attacking runs himself than Alonso every made - when he's confident - which is a key for him. Mascherano actually plays some ambitious passes, but usually inaccurately.

But the point about the system is that Lucas and Mascherano (and I'd submit, not as defensive as accepted wisdom has them) is not necessarily the automatic first choice partnership. At the beginning of the season, Gerrard played central midfield on a number of occasions, with Kuyt in the hole and Benayoun on the right. Aquilani has played and will play in the role (most of the games he's been rested/dropped for have been on poor pitches or against physical opponents; Benitez is certainly being cautious with his ankle). The Lucas and Aquilani partnership has looked very promising - we suddenly looked much more fluid in the middle, passing and moving at a quicker tempo and with the two dovetailing to a degree Lucas never has with Mascherano. Of course, Liverpool need Gerrard and Torres at the highest level; over the course of a full season, or against the top opposition. But the 'two man team' idea is a tired old cliche.

[RT--]

Some more discussion on Man United's wide play, this season, from a web-site (that I've only just come across) which may be of interest to tactics fans:

http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/03/07/manchester-united-lopsided-right-wingers/

[Coolcup]

The thing that interests me the most (and it may not be interesting to anyone else), is that the one thing everyone seems to agree on is that there is a back four. The argument to me seems to be completely focused on the midfield arrangement and the way the team shape changes from defence to attacking phases during a game.

My question is what has happened to the 5-3-2 formation or 5-4-1? I can see this working in several possible ways, and hope you can follow my descriptions:

1. 3CBs and 2 wing backs bombing forward to provide width in attack. Three CMs with the centre having a more attacking role and the LCM and RCM helping to support the attack and cover the fullbacks if they have charged forward too far. 2 strikers to play in whichever combination supports their attributes.

2. Same as 1, but the central CM pushed forward to an AMC role and the LCM and RCM having slightly more defensive biases

3. Same as 1, but the central CM pushed backwards to be a DMC and the LCM and RCM having attacking biases

On paper it would seem that the 5-3-2 achieves the objectives of a well balance formation - plenty of numbers through the middle of the park (3CMs and 3CBs) but not sacrificing width due to the presence of aggressive fullbacks / wingbacks.

Do you guys think this would work on FM 10 or are there some fundamental flaws with the 5-3-2 which is why managers do not seem to use it at all?

Look forward to your responses and apologies if I have missed any very obvious flaws as I am not so familiar with the deep history of the game as some of the more experienced posters.

[RT--]

The classic argument is that, with most teams playing just one striker, a third center-back is rendered useless and means you're going to be outnumbered somewhere else on the pitch.

Likewise, if you rely on central midfield players to help cover your flanks (and you'll inevitably need to, if the opposition's got a full-back and a winger up against your one wing-back), then you begin to sacrifice numbers in the middle. In fact, the site I linked to above makes a good argument that that's what cost Fiorentina against Bayern, on Tuesday night ( http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/03/10/fiorentina-3-2-bayern-wingers-robben-ribery )

Of course, there's nothing to say that with the right mix of players and with sensible use of 'touchline shouts' (or wideplay options) you can't counter those weaknesses. One of the joys of FM, for me, is experimenting with supposedly unfashionable or unusual systems and seeing if you can't make them work against the modern 4-5-1s or 4-4-2s.

[RT--]

Btw, following the United-Milan ties and the great job Ji Sung Park did at both closing down Pirlo's space and linking up midfield and attack, I've got five quid on Jonathan Wilson's next column being something along the lines of: 'Are defensive attacking midfielders the future?'

[SFraser]

Btw, following the United-Milan ties and the great job Ji Sung Park did at both closing down Pirlo's space and linking up midfield and attack, I've got five quid on Jonathan Wilson's next column being something along the lines of: 'Are defensive attacking midfielders the future?'

I think he would be better off writing about flexible players with the ability to defend and attack.

Park did a sterling job on Pirlo but Milan had Flamini and Huntelaar down their right, a DM and a Striker. Park was stuck right ontop of Milans playmaker, a guy he could harrass and outrun all night long. There was limited creative threat down Milans right, and on the other flank where Ronaldinho was playing, Valencia and Neville had a great night doubling up in attack and defence. Three of the four goals for United came down Milans left flank, and the other goal was a ball into that area that wasn't defended properly.

It's another example of what I was saying before. Sticking the right men for the right job in the right places. Direct play with few men down the flank Milan were defensively strong and creatively weak. Considered build up play and double teaming and numbers attacking the flank where Milan were defensively weak and Creatively strong.

The excuse for Milan is that they are ageing team, but United had Scholes and Neville in the side and they both had excellent games. Neville is old enough to be Ronaldinhos father, but he had his number all game and played him to perfection. Scholes had an excellent game, and with Flamini occupied by Nani and Pirlo occupied by Park, Scholes and Fletcher had the midfield sown up. Fletcher had a poor game by his standards, but Scholes was excellent. He nearly ripped Flamini's legs off after Flamini had clattered both him and Vidic earlier in the game. It would have been a sure booking had he connected, but it would have been a sure warning to Flamini not to try thinking he owned the pitch. The ball into Park for the third goal was classic Scholes.

Overall the performance was less than top drawer but the tactics were spot on. You could say 7-2 is a flattering scoreline yet at the same time United never played particularly well in either game. The tactics for the second leg were perfect though.

And that is the thing about Park. He is very much a tactical player for United. He is a lot better around the box than most give him credit for, but is pretty much an absolute disaster inside the box. Irrespective of where his defensive duties are in the team, and he always has important defensive duties, he attacks the centre. He gets alot of chances and they usually come from excellent link-up play and excellent awareness around the box, but he has this horrible tendency to rush and panic every key touch.

If Jonathan Wilson writes about "defensive attacking midfielders" then he is about five years behind the curve. United's game in recent years is all about beating the opponents tactics. Park can play Left, Right or Centre but where he plays depends on the opposition and the players available to United. This whole appreciation of Park stemming from last nights match is simply a sign that it takes goals and obvious defensive duties for a player to be recognised. Park was poor in Rome because Barcelona completely by-passed his role in the team defending the flanks and played through the middle. He was great last night because Milan defended the superficial attacking strength and attacked the superficial defensive weakness and left Pirlo as the obvious key in his usual role, and Ferguson stuck Park on him.

[Kawee]

I think we must keep in mind that the formation (4-4-2, 3-5-2, etc) is just the framework...the starting point.

Fergie could set up his team as a 4-4-2, but when played, it need not look like the "ideal" 4-4-2. He could say the following:

@ Rooney: You lead the line. Look for channels to run into, and get into the box for crosses. In defense, however, you're the fitter more energetic one so drop back into midfield to harass the opponents midfield

@Berbatov: You support Rooney. You're the creative second striker. Move across the width of the pitch so you can pick up the ball, control the tempo, and create the chances.

@Valencia: Stay out wide to provide width, penetration, and stretch the defense. A central midfielder or a rightback will cover the space you left behind. Cuts inside when the ball is on the left side so that you can be picked out for a scoring chance. Hold the right flank in defense.

@ Park: Evra will bomb past you to create width and penetrate, and so will Valencia. Tuck inside to provide cover for Evra, while Carrick/Scholes can move out wide right to cover Valencia. Pick up any 2nd balls, to recycle attack. If counter-attacked, harass and delay the opponents so Evra, Rooney, and Valencia can get into their defensive position. When back in defense, hold the left flank.

Etc Etc Etc.

This is all imaginary of course. It's just to demonstrate how 4-4-2 may not look like 4-4-2 at all, at a certain point in play. However, 4-4-2 was the framework, the guideline. Park was the left-midfielder, Valencia the right-midfielder but they had very different instructions.

Now imagine Arsenal with Henry, Bergkamp, Pires, Ljungberg, Vieira, Gilberto, Cole, etc etc.

Both Pires and Ljungberg were the wingers. However, they both cut inside, the former more to create, and the latter more to score. Lauren and Cole bombed forward. Bergkamp drop deep, and HEnry go wide left, leaving space in the middle for Pires, Ljungerg, or Vieira to run into. Gilberto stayed back to hold the whole thing together.

4-4-2 once again, but look very different.

My point is, I don't think the managers are always looking to transform their base formation into 3-4 other formations. They have their base formation, and they have different instructions for different players all working within the framework. Sometimes it result in looking like another formation.

[heathxxx]

My point is, I don't think the managers are always looking to transform their base formation into 3-4 other formations. They have their base formation, and they have different instructions for different players all working within the framework. Sometimes it result in looking like another formation.

Entirely something I've always looked to do in FM. For most of FM09, I played what looked like an attacking 4-4-2, but played completely differently. The instructions to my players made it play more like a 4-2-1-3. The "core" was a 4-4-2 in principal, but the key was movement off and on the ball.

Ultimately, what's on paper, can look completely different once you watch the game itself.

[Comedybegs]

Entirely something I've always looked to do in FM. For most of FM09, I played what looked like an attacking 4-4-2, but played completely differently. The instructions to my players made it play more like a 4-2-1-3. The "core" was a 4-4-2 in principal, but the key was movement off and on the ball.

Ultimately, what's on paper, can look completely different once you watch the game itself.

Same can be said for me as well. My 4-3-3 plays more like a 2-3-2-3 for the most part when attacking and a 4-2-2-2-1 in defence. Plus by adding more numbers it sounds a bit fancier, a bit like when people rave about Arteta because he is foreign and exotic, yet completely overlook Osman because he is English and sounds ordinary!

[heathxxx]

Plus by adding more numbers it sounds a bit fancier

Sweeper-Keeper!

[SFraser]

Same can be said for me as well. My 4-3-3 plays more like a 2-3-2-3 for the most part when attacking and a 4-2-2-2-1 in defence. Plus by adding more numbers it sounds a bit fancier, a bit like when people rave about Arteta because he is foreign and exotic, yet completely overlook Osman because he is English and sounds ordinary!

It's not a case of being exotic or fancy, it's a case of accuracy and getting the point across. 4-4-2 is incredibly poor at describing any football you are likely to see in the Premier League this season, yet is regularly trotted out by broadcasters who invariably get not only the formation wrong, but often the side of the pitch players are lining up on. There is an obsession with looking for and finding 4-4-2 in every football match.

The important "formations" are the shape of the team when defending and the shape of the team when attacking. These are very rarely going to be the same as each other although most teams play very obvious lines of attacking movement from defensive positions. Not being able to see the game in terms of movement is a serious tactical weakness.

[SCIAG]

4-2-2-2-1 in defence.

Fairly sure it isn't

[crouchaldinho]

Perhaps it is SCIAG. Maybe that's why his tactic is so effective.

[Comedybegs]

Fairly sure it isn't

Perhaps it is SCIAG. Maybe that's why his tactic is so effective.

Lol... Maybe I should proof read before I give away my secrets next time!

[SCIAG]

Easy mistake to make. I once started to tell someone about my 3-4-2- d'oh! That's even worse, because instead of forgetting to take away the goalkeeper, I took him away twice...

[Invader Canuck]

A handful of neat observations, drowning in a sea of weasel words, hype, and imagination.

Nail on head.

The prose was pretty weak as well. Keep discussions about football tactics simple and direct. The attempt at flowery description was painful and awkward. Not to mention most of the conclusions drawn and formation break downs were complete rubbish.

Some of those formations you demonstrated however were quite fanciful.

It was captivating stuff however. I kept thinking "what is he going to pull out of his ass next then rationalize with made up BS".

[SFraser]

Nail on head.

The prose was pretty weak as well. Keep discussions about football tactics simple and direct. The attempt at flowery description was painful and awkward. Not to mention most of the conclusions drawn and formation break downs were complete rubbish.

Some of those formations you demonstrated however were quite fanciful.

It was captivating stuff however. I kept thinking "what is he going to pull out of his ass next then rationalize with made up BS".

Yes it was me and me alone that invented the idea of wrong footed wingers, attacking fullbacks, DM's, dual AMC's and lone strikers playing key playmaker roles. I also made up the idea of continually adapting formations to the opponents. The key attacking zones either side of the DM's and inside the fullbacks is also an invention of mine, and the fact that 5 of the last 6 World Player of the Year awards have gone to players that attack those channels directly, at pace and from deep is a complete fluke.

And in another stroke of pure fluke, despite inventing all this stuff myself and it being completely "fanciful bs" there was quite a shock to see most of it employed in your own sole tactical thread. What was your reasoning for your Central "False 9"?

The theory behind this tactic is the idea of the "false 9". Since I was unable to make a proper strikerless formation work before I ran out of patience, I have created a formation where the central of the three forwards plays very deep pulling defenders out of position allowing my other two strikers to run into the space he is creating. For me it has worked remarkably well.

Well fancy that. A trequartista playing in the Centre Forward position creating space for wide forwards as Centrebacks get pulled out of position.

If you were to employ two attacking playmakers in the midfield slots, like the Xavi and Iniesta combination Barcelona don't use, behind the Central Trequartista like Ibrahimovic that Barcelona doesn't play, then you would have yourself an incredibly potent W shaped attack getting into all the gaps in a 4-1-X defence and pulling players out of position, like no one else on the planet employs.

I understand you didn't like the "flowery prose" but I suggest next time you wish to comment that first of all you pay attention, and second of all you post something worth reading. Most of the conclusions drawn and formation breakdowns in this thread have found their way into your own tactical thread so either we are both fools and you are not paying attention, or you are not paying attention.