Oakland Stomper

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  1. Thanks for the reply Rashidi. My intuition was as you advised and its didn't do the trick. I also used wingers on support and instructed them to stay wide. I think that team shape and mentality may play a role in whether or not the fullback continues his run. This is where your knowledge might be helpful. The genesis of the this comes from a team which I coached decades ago. They were a very bright group of lads who really understood space and movement. If the pass over the top wasn't on to my very fast forward, they knock it wide to the winger who was hugging the touchline. That was the signal for the fullback to begin his run at speed. From there he was through and would run to even with the 6 yd box to send a short near post cross. I had literally showed this to them once and they ran it to perfection. I still smile when I look at the pic that I have of this team. Not the most talented players who I coached, but by far the best team.
  2. ajsr, Thanks for the reply. I fiddled with a couple of different 4 at the back formations last night as time allowed and couldn't get the results that I was looking for. The issue with inverted wingbacks is that they go right past the half space into the middle of the pitch with no intention of crossing. A couple of days ago I was able to get the a conventional fullback to come inside the wing, but he would stop his run dead. I couldn't even get this to happen last night. I thought that it might be easier to get wide midfielders to break inside the forwards when they went wide to get the ball. This didn't happen either, but that could be down to other factors, specifically how my opponent's formation/mentality. I'm not giving up on this because I know how effective this can be. Any additional suggestions are more than welcome -OS
  3. Has anyone been able to create an underlap as opposed the overlap? I'm trying to get the wide midfielders to run into the half-spaces and focus on the low near post cross. I find that inverted wingbacks angle toward the near post, look for the through ball and clog the middle. I'd prefer to have one of my two forwards (in a 3-5-2) to break wide and have the wingback move inside him, but I have a feeling that the match engine won't allow for this. My other idea was to play with wingers on support (4-4-2 or 4-5-1) and instruct them to hug the line while telling the fullback on attack to cut inside. Ideas? -OS
  4. Rashidi, Thanks for letting this thread remain open. I skipped over FM 2016, and this discussion has helped me understand how the game has evolved. I'm getting a better picture of why my old tactics aren't nearly as effective. Whether Richard was correct in his guidelines or not is certainly open to discussion, but once I made the adjustments that he suggested, my results improved dramatically. FM 2017 is proving to be a great challenge. Thanks once again -OS
  5. In my somewhat limited viewing of Atletico this year, I think that they've further evolved away from being primarily a counter attacking team. They've also used the 4-1-4-1 very, very often. Actually I think that there can be a fairly in-depth discussion as to whether this is a 4-1-2-2-1/4-3-3 or a 4-1-4-1/4-5-1. When you look at the video clips early in the thread, they seem, in my view to be playing with an attacking tactic that uses "drop much deeper" and "play narrower" TI's. Achieving the level of closing down that is visible is very difficult with the counter mentality in FM. Another key aspect of Simeone's tactics is their highly structured approach. The roles are very distinct and remain the same no matter who is in the line-up. Viewed within the FM team mentality, they do tend to open up quite a bit in attack. Its actually this rapid opening of the playing area when moving from defending to attacking Simeone's team has mastered.
  6. I'm sure that this has worked well, but I have to ask, why play on the counter with Real? It would seem ill suited to a team with so much talent and such a high reputation.
  7. The Artisan tactic that you posted was my primary in the waining days of FM 2015. Remember that he didn't mimic the Simeone's set pieces which are a key aspect of Atletico's strategy. I haven't had much of a chance to try to replicate this in FM 2016. What I've had has gone into trying to develop a Gasperini 3-4-3 which has been about as effective a Genoa's season to date.
  8. Uploaded the steam upgrade and now this message appears when I attempt to load and all versions of FM and I can access neither the games or the editors. Ideas?
  9. Chris, How has your tactic been progressing?
  10. Great thread Chris! Way back in the CM days, I was the person who designed the 4-5-1Norway formation that gave people fits. The tactical limitations of the game then along with the text only feedback prevented me from knowing what was really going on "under the hood" but it worked (I qualified Northern Ireland for the WC using it). Drillo used statistical analysis for every aspect of his analysis and tried to transfer this into his tactical model. In a sense, he was one of the first to try to apply the "moneyball" concepts to soccer. There is some solid information on this in "Inverting the Pyramid." I also have a book with a presentation which he made titled " An Analysis of Goal Scoring Strategies in the World Cup in Mexico, 1986. Anyway, I've been a follower, though not adherent to Drillo's concepts since the WC 1994 and there are some things that I've learned that I think might be applicable here. The absolute key for Drillo is to catch the other off balance or as he put it imbalanced. He advocated fast restarts whenever possible and this needs to be included, though I would say that he likes the long throw-in against an established defense. Drillo would never use a fluid mentality. In fact, he was probably one of the most structured managers ever. He was a firm believer in specialized players and viewed them as game changers. Of course every player in his side had to have high levels work rate and teamwork, but this was is almost a given with Norwegian players, especially in the 1990's. How you arrange the roles in order to arrive at the minimum of 4 specialists is open and flexible (see below) I think that he actually used a 4-5-1 as opposed to a 4-1-4-1. This isn't as semantic as it sounds. He wanted the midfield band to prevent balls from getting to the defense and to do this there must not be any gaps. In the numerous matches that I've watched, it didn't look to me as if the most central players was dropping off much if at all. As Cleon pointed out, the outside midfielders were not defensive midfielders. You can't get the outside target man role (which was a part of the tactic that was not used all of the time) when playing them in this role. In fact, the roles of these players was changed to fit the personnel and I think to a degree the opponent. At times one might have been a wide midfielder on either attack or support, while the other might have been a winger on attack. I think that setting the relationship between the outside backs and outside midfielders needs to be flexible and is critical to making this work effectively. Theoretically both central midfield "runners" would be B2B, bit this varied a bit and I think that you identified this to a degree. Leonhardsen was the ultimate player in this role and not a BWM. When Strand played, they were effectively a matched set, but when Mykland played, I think that he was more of a Roaming Playermaker. To me, the striker in this system is the quintessential Defensive Forward. Drillo's 'keepers played a very conventional role. The key here is that he will always play the ball long. Drillo felt that getting the ball deep into the other team's half was essential and that you didn't want the ball in your own GK's hands. In fact he said that this was the most dangerous time for a team. I do think that "Counter-attacking" is the way to go. Remember that the goal was to get the ball into the opponents "backyard" as quickly as possible and you need to create space in that area. Raising the tempo via a TI will make it more realistic, but also keep in mid that with the counter mentality, you central defenders will send more balls forward. Really the devil will be in the details, which means lots of work on PI's and somewhat less on the TI's and that should probably be the next level of the discussion. Anyway, I look forward to the evolution of this thread while I return to trying to craft an updated version of my Rosenborg/Eggen philosophy.
  11. My experience with the patch is similar to yours. My 4-1-4-1, Attacking/Flexible with cautious TI's designed to create space for quick counters is getting crushed. Prior to the patch I rarely lost with it.
  12. I think that the key to replicating Atletico is understudying the basic premises which Simeone brings to the game. Key is organization. They defend AND attack in a very set and precise manner. All players have role and they stick to it. Simeone is a structured, some might even say a very structured manager. This does not preclude flair and creativity; I think that there are a lot of misconceptions in this regard. In 2013/14 they played a deep narrow 4-4-2 that countered quickly through Costa. This year they play much higher and somewhat wider because until Griezmann broke through/adapted, they didn't have speed guy up top. Another key change this year has been the use of the the 4-1-2-3 and the 4-1-4-1. Some would say that these are one in the same but they aren't. The 4-1-2-3 is very narrow, almost using 3 true forwards and also very direct. Generally its been used against clubs who use three central defenders, Juventus in the first leg of their CL group and Rayo this past weekend for example. In the latest La Liga match they really pressed hard which can be seen in Griezmann's first goal. Simeone is known a tinkerer and I also think that he chooses team shape based on the players that are available. So going forward I'd say that Atletico's current 4-4-2 looks something like this: Standard Structured Gk : Moya WB-r (a): JuanFran WB-l (a): Ansaldi/Siqueira CD (d): Miranda/Gimenez CD (d): Godin/Gimenez WM-r (a): Arda B2B (s): Gabi CM (d): Tiago WP-l (s): Koke F9 (s): Garcia early, Griezmann now TM (s): Mandzukic Team instructions are situational, variable and evolve during a match. "Get Stuck In", "Exploit the Flanks" and "Higher Tempo" would seem to be standard. "Play Narrower" no longer is though. Player instructions would follow the above pattern. Saul is a different WP than Koke and Suarez is a different CM (d) than Tiago for example. These are just some of my observations and not meant stimulate discussion.
  13. I don't think that will do it. The outside forwards didn't close down the outside backs. Rather they were clearly zone marking. This seems to be standard procedure for Simone's sides no matter what formation that they play. Against Sevilla the previous weekend, Atleti was clearly in a 4-1-4-1/4-5-1 with the outside players much more withdrawn. The narrowness of the tree forwards vs. Juve is a method that has been used successfully against teams playing with 3 central defenders and in this instance I think that it was effective.
  14. I think that the OP was speaking about the specific match vs. Juve. If so, Atleti didn't use their usual 4-4-2/4-4-1-1. Instead it was a 4-1-2-2-1/4-3-3 that I hadn't seen from Simone since the 2012-13 season (granted I'm only able to watch @7-8 of their matches per season). The back 4 were pretty much as usual, with the two DC's staying narrow and tight and the FB's (not WB's) making sporadic runs forward; Juanfran seeming to do so more than Ansaldi. The three midfielders played a narrow triangle with Tiago at the base playing mostly as a DM and Koke and Niguez breaking into any seems that they could find. I would say that they were CM-S's. The front three are hard to make happen in FM I'm afraid. They also stayed narrow for the most part, almost like three true forwards. Once they got into the Juve 18, they were rarely more than 3-4 meters apart and interchanged often. The wide forwards did drop when out of possession, but didn't join in the midfield line very often. Actually even Mandzukic even drops pretty deep when out of possession. Hope that this helps.
  15. I watched the entire match vs. Hellas Verona yesterday, and Cagliari played nothing like previous Zeman teams. Whether this is down to his instructions or his players inability to adjust to what he's asking them to do is open to question, but they were slower in the build up and seemed more like a counter-attacking side. The one thing that that they still exhibited was defensive fragility. Zeman clearly doesn't practice this aspect of the game much, if at all. I can see his stay at Cagliari ending soon.