[TOTAL FOOTBALL GREAT TACTIC 151 GOALS SCORED IN ONE SEASON ONLY 25 ALLOWED]

wow, very good, those are good results. I am happy the tactic works for you too and suits Celtic, let me know if  during the season you notice some problems, or things that could be improved, thank you

[TOTAL FOOTBALL GREAT TACTIC 151 GOALS SCORED IN ONE SEASON ONLY 25 ALLOWED]

Yes, please try it and then if you want, tell me how it goes, what flaws you found, and of course if you have some advices I am here to listen.

No, I don't change anything in the tactic during the game because it takes time to the players to adapt themselves to a new playing style and if you change again during the game it will break the balance you reached with the tactic. So you do it right, only change subs. 

I leave the opponent instructions to my assistant coach or follow his advices. or sometimes when I know the players well, I mark the strongest ones tighter, press them and force them to play with their weak foot. For example, if I play against Manchester City, everybody knows that Haaland, Kevin De Bruyne, Grealish and Bernardo Silva are dangerous. If I play against a 3rd tier team and I do not know who they are I follow my scouts and my assistant coach advice. 

In the case I got a red card, it depends who gets it.  In this 4-3-3 there is a midfielder who plays in front of the defense, the Defensive Midfielder. He is the one I replace when someone else's got a red card but it depends on who gets it.

1. Central forward: I don't do anything, I play a more defensive game unless I am losing then I may still try to replace the DM with a Central forward

2. The DM gets red card: I am winning: I replace the central forward with another Defensive midfielder. I am losing: I must score so I do not remove a forward

3. Other players get red card: I replace the DM with a new player in same position of the one who got the red card

 

[TOTAL FOOTBALL GREAT TACTIC 151 GOALS SCORED IN ONE SEASON ONLY 25 ALLOWED]

thank you. 

Yes, I guess it will suit Celtic, Postecoglou also played a very attacking 4-3-3. You can try

You just gave me a new idea on what club to pick in one of my next tactic emulations videos, thank you very much

 

[TOTAL FOOTBALL GREAT TACTIC 151 GOALS SCORED IN ONE SEASON ONLY 25 ALLOWED]

 

TACTIC: 4-2-4 (OR 4-2-3-1 DEPENDING ON CRUIJFF’S POSITION)
IN POSSESSION: 2-2-6
NON-POSSESSION: 4-4-1-1

If we think about modern football, we think of something fluid, characterized by off-the-ball movements and quick exchanges between players. We think of courageous defenses pushing forward to try to stifle the opponent's play. However, it can undoubtedly be said that all of this was anticipated and developed by Rinus Michels' Netherlands in 1974. This magnificent team, with Cruijff as its leading figure, didn't manage to win the competition (losing in the final), but it showed the world something new that would go down in history as Total Football. In particular, when observing the 2-0 victory over Brazil (the reigning champion), it becomes evident how the team led by Michels was already ahead of its time compared to other teams (even the best ones). Let's delve into the characteristics of this Netherlands team in more detail.
Giving a numerical definition to this team is quite limiting, but if we were to try to define a basic system for this team, we could call it a 4-2-4 or a 4-2-3-1 (depending on Cruijff's position). In goal, Jongbloed was fielded; the defensive line consisted of Suurbier on the right and Krol on the left (although often the two freely exchanged flanks), with both full-backs pushing forward vigorously to provide width to the Dutch attack and allow the wingers to cut inside the field. The central defenders were Rijsbergen (the marker of the defensive line) and Haan (a player with great technical ability, crucial in the build-up play). The two central midfielders were Jansen and Van Hanegem, both essential in maintaining balance for a team that always sought to move forward. At the same time, both, especially Van Hanegem, were highly skilled in passing and geometry. The attacking line consisted of four players, with Rep on the right and Rensenbrink on the left (both highly technically proficient and fast), and Neeskens and Cruijff (the captain and absolute talent of the team) roamed freely in the central zone, dropping deep to meet the team and participate in the passing game to avoid giving reference points to opposing central defenders and to provide numerical superiority for their team during the development phase.

In the possession phase, it's even more challenging to provide a numerical definition for Michels' team setup. However, we could describe their arrangement as a 2/2-6 formation. Rijsbergen and one of either Haan or Jansen were tasked with pre-marking the opposing forwards (who would often be sought with long passes). Van Hanegem and one of Jansen or Haan positioned themselves halfway between the two pre-markers and the rest of the team, providing constant support for Dutch possession play.
The remaining six players formed a cohesive block that constantly rotated among themselves (although Suurbier and Krol tended to stay wider). This rotation was designed to deny reference points to opponents and create space for themselves, offering a passing outlet for the player in possession of the ball. It's evident that this structure was made possible by the high technical and tactical quality of all Michels' players. They demonstrated the ability to adapt to the various situations that the game presented regardless of the area of the field they had to occupy at that moment. This adaptability based on the team's needs in a particular situation is the foundation of positional play in football.
In the defensive phase, providing specific numbers is also very complex because players must adapt their roles based on their position on the field. Nevertheless, there was a tendency to form a 4-4-1/1 structure. One of either Cruijff or Neeskens would take turns staying higher up the pitch to disrupt the opposing center-backs and preemptively mark them when they attempted long passes. The other player in the Dutch duo would hinder the opponent's central midfielder from dropping deep to assist in the build-up. If the opponent received the ball, they would be immediately pressurized.
Rep and Rensenbrink formed a line of four with Van Hanegem and Jansen, but even in this case, the players (except Jansen, who stayed somewhat deeper) tended to detach from the line to press the opponent in their respective zones as soon as they gained possession. The defensive line comprised Suurbier, Haan, Rijsbergen, and Krol, and it played high and aggressively to maximize the offside trap and keep the team compact.

Possession Phase
Regarding the build-up, the key player is Haan. He is highly technically skilled and often receives the ball, unafraid to manage it, take risks, and engage in one-on-ones in his own half, knowing that his fellow defender Rijsbergen is ready to cover for him. This enables him to carry the ball into the opponent's half and play a vertical pass to an attacking teammate (often either Cruijff or Neeskens, who serve as high points) or an outside forward. When Haan cannot progress into the opponent's half for vertical passes, the Dutch defender can pass the ball to Van Hanegem (who then initiates the Dutch build-up characterized by numerous exchanges) or to Jongbloed, who, after receiving the ball (back-passes were still allowed), will attempt a long pass to one of the four players in the forward line (most often Cruijff or Neeskens).
The development phase of Michels' team is marked by the great movement of its players, especially Cruijff and Van Hanegem. While the width in possession is provided by Suurbier and Krol's movements across the wings, Van Hanegem and Cruijff are the real stars because they constantly adjust their positions to support the player in possession. Van Hanegem often drops deeper to provide support, while Cruijff moves forward to offer an advanced option.
This results in continuous player rotations in the central part of the field, forming triangles and diamonds in the build-up. The ball moves quickly between players and is then played wide behind the opponent's defense to one of the full-backs, who can cross for one of the many attacking teammates entering the opponent's box.
The typical sequence in which the Netherlands developed their play involved: the ball to Van Hanegem, a pass to Rep or Rensenbrink (who had moved inside, dragging their marker and creating space for the full-back), a lay-off to Cruijff or Neeskens, a return pass to Van Hanegem, a wide ball to Suurbier or Krol, and a cross behind the defense to find Cruijff, Rep, Neeskens, or Rensenbrink.

 

Another characteristic of Michels' team is the use of non-"positional" attackers who are playmakers in the attack, such as Cruijff and Neeskens. These players don't stay static in the penalty area to be marked by opposing defenders; instead, they move towards the team, shifting the opposing defensive line. This movement creates spaces that can be exploited by their attacking teammates who advance, providing numerical superiority and facilitating quick passing play.
This tactical flexibility and the ability of Cruijff and Neeskens to adapt to the game context by moving to create space and opportunities for their teammates were key elements in the success of Michels' system of play. Their skill in combining fast passing with intelligent movement made the team extremely dangerous in attack.

As for the work on the flanks, we've already discussed how this responsibility falls to Suurbier and Krol (full-backs with the qualities of wide attackers). The play that the Dutch team most frequently employed involves laying off the ball to Cruijff or Neeskens, with Rep and Rensenbrink tucking inside to draw the opposing defense in. Krol and Suurbier attack rapidly into the open spaces to receive the ball from the layoff by Cruijff or Neeskens, or from the vertical pass played by Van Hanegem (if he received the layoff from the forwards). They then deliver a swift cross behind the defense.
The 2-0 goal scored by Cruijff against Brazil perfectly illustrates this. Haan delivered a pass to Krol, the full-back laid it off to Neeskens, who came forward, causing the Brazilian defensive line to step up. Neeskens then played a deep ball down the left flank, received by Krol, who had by then advanced to the opponent's penalty area. Krol delivered a cross behind the Brazilian defensive line, and with them focused on Neeskens, Cruijff, who had already bypassed the Brazilian central defenders, could attack the near post and receive Krol's cross.

 

The non-possession phase of Michels' team is characterized by the players' high level of aggression. The objective is to suffocate the opposing ball carrier by pushing forward and pressing them as soon as they enter the player's area of responsibility. This constant pressure forces the opponent to retreat continuously until they are compelled to play a long pass. At that point, the defensive line moves up to the midfield to catch the opposing attacker offside if the ball is played towards them.

Defending line very high to keep the team compact
Non-Possession Phase
In the non-possession phase, Michels' team displayed a high level of aggression. The goal was to press the opposing ball carrier relentlessly as they entered the player's area of responsibility. This constant pressure forced the opponent to retreat continually until they were compelled to play a long pass. At that point, the defensive line moved up to the midfield to catch the opposing attacker offside if the ball was played towards them.
This approach led the Dutch forward line of four to continuously press the opponents in their own half. This tactic could potentially expose the Dutch defensive line to a counter-attack by an opponent who could quickly break through their pressing via fast passing or sprinting. However, this risk was mitigated by the tactical intelligence of Van Hanegem and Jansen. They acted as the "second defense," covering the back of the forward who pushed forward and immediately closing down the opponent coming out of the pressure (even committing fouls if necessary) before they could gain momentum.
To allow for this ultra-aggressive approach, it was crucial to carefully time when to move the defensive line. Haan served as the coordinator of the defensive unit, guiding their movements and instructing teammates to step up to continually compress the space for the opponents, forcing them to play in tight areas where the Dutch were often superior to their adversaries. The overall result was a continuous territorial gain by Michels' team. The forwards pressured the ball carrier, who was forced to retreat. As they retreated, the defense stepped up, and Van Hanegem and Jansen worked to further close the gap between the four attacking players and the defensive line. Consequently, the opposing team was forced to play quickly and in very tight spaces, often resulting in turnovers.
Transitions
The transitions of the Dutch national team led by Michels were heavily influenced by the incredible density the team maintained around the ball (a result of their defensive aggressiveness and off-the-ball movement in possession). If the team was in possession and lost the ball, they would have many players in close proximity to the opponent who had regained possession and could immediately press to regain control of the ball (negative transition). If the team had just won back the ball (positive transition), the player in possession could choose to play quickly with one of the nearby teammates to initiate the rapid passing sequences typical of this team. Alternatively, if the situation allowed, they could initiate a fast counter-attack in open space, capitalizing on the technical skill possessed by all players in the team.

In conclusion, we can say that the Netherlands of 1974 played a crucial role in the development of modern football characterized by intensity and off-the-ball movements.
Its strengths included:
1.    The Difficulty for Opponents to Find Stable Reference Points on the Field: This was due to the constant movement and interchangeability among Michels' players.
2.    The Versatility of Its Players: Dutch players were functional in every area of the field, forcing their direct opponents to follow them across the pitch, thereby opening up spaces in the defensive system that could then be exploited by another player.
3.    The Exceptional Individual Technical Skills of Its Players: The team was filled with players who possessed outstanding technical abilities.
4.    A Star Like Cruijff: Johan Cruijff's ability to roam across the field forced multiple opponents to track him, creating space for his teammates.
5.    A Highly Aggressive Defensive Phase: Their aggressive defensive style pressured opponents into making mistakes.
Weaknesses included:
1.    The Need for Perfectly Timed Defensive Movements: The Dutch team relied on precise defensive line movements to advance, and any mistiming could expose them to long balls over the top.
2.    Limited Defensive Contribution from Rep and Rensenbrink: These attacking players were not as inclined to defend the flanks in their own half.
3.    Frequent Fouls Committed by Van Hanegem and Jansen: When an opponent managed to break through the pressing of the attacking players, Van Hanegem and Jansen often resorted to fouls to halt the play.
Overall, the 1974 Netherlands team left a lasting impact on football with its innovative and dynamic style of play, and their approach to the game has influenced the way football is played today.

 

HOW TO EMULATE TOTAL FOOTBALL ON FOOTBALL MANAGER 2023
TACTIC: 4-2-4 (OR 4-2-3-1 DEPENDING ON CRUIJFF’S POSITION)
IN POSSESSION: 2-2-6
NON-POSSESSION: 4-4-1-1
We should start from the non-possession formation to emulate the tactic in Football Manager, because when the players have the ball then they will move according to the tactic to the positions they have in the possession phase. 

So, now let’s examine how I emulate this on Football Manager 2023
In this emulation, we are looking for player rotations, high press, and attacking mentality where everyone contributing to the attacking phase because this is what total football means, every player must be able to play in every position, attack as a team and defend as a team. 

1.    Formation Line-Up and Mentality

First of all, formation and mentality. 
For total-football, an attacking mentality is a must, so let’s start with this. 
The formation, as mentioned before, when in possession was a 4-2-4 or a 4-2-3-1 depending on Crujiff’s position, while when out of possession, it was a 4-4-1-1. It’s my personal opinion that to decide what formation to pick up, you must start using the out-of possession formation, because when the team gets the ball back, the players will move to form the attacking formation. 
Having that said, in this case, we have the two wingers, Rep and Rensenbrink who are a part of a block of 6 attacking players which includes them, the two full-backs and the two forwards. To replicate this, we can’t put the two wingers too down, in line with the midfielders, so we must make a compromise. I believe the best compromise is a 4-3-3 with two wingers high-up and instead of 2 midfielders on the same line, one close to another, we will have 3 midfielders, one of them will drop down, in front of the defense to cover up more, while the other two midfielders will have more attacking duties. 

2.    Team Instructions
In total-football, possession is one of the keys, so your team must control the ball. To do so, I chose shorter passing, so that the players will pass the ball to each other with greater accuracy and less mistakes while they move all around the pitch. Michels wanted his team to play wide, so a wide attacking width is also a must. 
What about tempo? Well, players in total football moved very fast, but to replicate it on Football Manager Match Engine, you should select Higher tempo, but this will lead your players to mistakes sometimes, so a slightly higher tempo is maybe a better choice to retain possession more. Work the ball into the box is also a good choice if you want to see good possession play. 
Another instruction you can give ONLY if your players have good skills is be more expressive. Why? Because this way those more skilled players will sometimes try something different from the tactic instructions and probably create more opportunities to score. 
The other thing we must notice is Crujiff and Neeskens roles, they are real playmakers in attack, they create space for other players, they switch positions and duties, one drops deeper the other moves forward, they are an example of non-positional forwards.

In the transition phase, counter and counter-press are both a must, if you search some video of Rinus Michel’s Holland games, you will see how they pressed the opponents and immediately started fast counter-attacks. With the aggressive defense, the off-the-ball movement in possession and the density they had, when they lost the ball, there were many players close to the opponent who had the ball so they could immediately counter-press to regain control and once won the ball they will play quickly to the nearby teammates or try a fast counter-attack.
In defense, as we said, we want high press, so to keep the team compact, our defensive line must be higher or much higher too. Obviously, trigger press will be on much more often and also prevent short Gk distribution and stay up (to use off-side trap). On football manager 22 the instruction was “use offside trap” but on Football manager23 they changed it to stay higher. Well, we have other two options here, trap outside or inside and stop crosses or invite crosses. I chose trap outside and stop crosses too. Let’s explain this. Trap outside as written in the game instructions means that you force your opponents to attack from the flanks, to play the ball wide because the center is not an available option. If you do that, you have one great advantage, because your opponent can dribble just straight or cutting inside because he can’t go wider or it will be a throw-in, or he can pass the ball back to another player and this means slowing down the play making it easier for our players to steal the ball.  If you trap inside, you funnel the ball into the center and force turnover in advantageous areas but it’s always a risk that the opposition tries to exploit the flanks. The other two options, if you invite crosses it means you want to allow the opponent to cross the ball in the box because you know your defenders are taller than the opponent’s forwards, it’s quite risky if your opponent usually likes to play long balls or a lot of crosses so I often choose to stop crosses or I don’t choose any of those two options. 

3.    Players roles and instructions

Let’s start from Jongbloed, he was comfortable in playing the ball and he can be considered a pioneer of the sweeper-keeper role. He is a sweeper-keeper on attack duty. 
As I said before in the tactic explanation, the two full-backs were pushing forward to provide width. That means we have two options here. One is to choose a role like complete wing-back or wing-back because they already have the “run wide with the ball” as preset instruction and in the case of the complete wing-back there is also another preset instruction, “stay wider”. The other option is to choose a full-back and give the instruction myself. If I give this instruction, it is enough to provide width and I don’t need, unless I want, to choose overlap right and left in the team instructions. Conversely, if you choose the overlap instruction you can avoid to give the full-backs. For this tactic I chose one wing-back on support duty on the right to emulate Suurbier and one complete full-back on support on the left to emulate Krol. 
Let’s see now the two central defenders, one was Rijsbergen, the more defensive one so I will choose a simple central defender on defense for him and tell him to mark tighter while the other was Haan a ball-playing defender,  the more technical one. I will put him on defense duty because in my opinion it’s always better that the two defenders even if they have different roles (such as in this case a central defender and a ball playing defender) have the same duty, to avoid one of them moves later than the other and the offside trap does not work. If you still want to emulate Haan’s stopper duty, you can set him as stopper (he was a former midfielder converted by Rinus Michels into a central defender), besides, since he often moved forward and carried the ball into the opponent’s half, I will give him the instruction to dribble more. 
Let’s now examine the midfielders, the one in front of the defense, the one who dropped more to help the defense to cover was Janssen, very good at tackling and marking. For him, I think a defensive midfielder role on defend is the best to stop opponent’s attacks in the central area of the pitch between our midfielders and our defenders. The other two midfielders, one of them. Van Hanegem was more technical and had great skills with the ball and great passing skills, I think for him, a deep-lying playmaker would be a good choice. 
Now, the other midfielder of our 4-3-3. I believe a central midfielder on attack or a mezzala on attack with the instruction to get further forward is the best way to replicate his movements to replicate the attacking fluidity of the classic Total Football system. 
I think if we pair a deep-lying playmaker with a mezzala, the first one can dictate play from deep positions, meanwhile, the mezzala on attack is an attack-minded role that looks to make forward runs into the box and contribute to the attack. This combination can create overloads in central areas during possession, resembling the 4-2-4 shape more realistic. 
If we pair a deep-lying playmaker with a central midfielder on attack, we provide a balance between creativity and forward runs. The central midfielder will join the attack with more urgency and this setup can also mimic the 4-2-4 shape in possession. 
In my tactic I choose a mezzala, even if the central midfielder is also a valid option because you can edit him more compared to the mezzala. 
Then, the attacking three, I think both wingers, Rep on the right and Rensenbrink on the left should be considered as 2 inside forwards on attack duty. You can instruct them to shoot more often, roam from position to encourage specific movements and decision-making, cut inside with ball and to sit narrower if you want them to be closer to the box, since Crujjff’s role, a trequartista, allows him to drop down, even to the midfield to get the ball and play it as he wants. Crujff was a genius who moved all around the pitch without any tactic limitations and other players could exploit the space left by him and attack the box. 
Finally, Cruyff. The best choice if you want to replicate his style of play and his movements is the Trequartista role. You can instruct him to roam from position to encourage even more movement and creativity. 
That’s all for this tactic creation explanation. 
The stats include also other competitions, not only Ligue 1
 

TOTAL FOOTBALL HOLLAND 1974.fmf

[Anges Tottenham]

Wow that's indeed what Ange wants, great xg, attacking players and tons of goals,  and possession. 

do you see tottenham overload spaces? 

I will test it in my next career

[DE ZERBI'S 4-2-3-1 TESTED WITH REAL VALLADOLID FINISHED 4TH]

Il 15/8/2023 in 01:33 , taciotenorio8 ha scritto:

Will try it! 

What skin??

this is Tangfu skin, you can find it online

[DE ZERBI'S 4-2-3-1 TESTED WITH REAL VALLADOLID FINISHED 4TH]

Il 14/8/2023 in 21:41 , dudge7 ha scritto:

Playing as Hearts, unbeaten in 10 since switching to this with a noticeable increase in clean sheets and possession, exactly what I was looking for 

i am happy it worked for you bro, it actually worked better for you than for me I guess.

did you notice some flaws/ things that could be improved? if any, please tell me

[DE ZERBI'S 4-2-3-1 TESTED WITH REAL VALLADOLID FINISHED 4TH]

 

Hello guys, this is my emulation of Roberto De Zerbi's 4-2-3-1 at Brighton. I tested it with Real Valladolid, a team 18th in Spanish Liga in reality and we finished 4th and qualified for Champions League 2023-24. As you can see from the transfer window screenshot, I did not make any transfer bargain, all those players names are already in Valladolid squad at the beginning of the career, you can try to start a new career with Valladolid database 23.3 or 23.4 and see it.

Let's give a brief introduction to the tactic As you can see from the tactic screenshot here, the tactic has an attacking mentality, I tried starting with a balanced mentality in the first 3 games of the Spanish Liga to avoid allowing too much space to stronger opponent (Real Valladolid is weaker than many other teams in the Liga) but I noticed that my team struggled to score and shoot while conceeding too much changes to the opponent. I decided to try an attacking mentality and the tactic started to work, after it I have never changed anything neither did I reloaded the game after losing a game, I managed to finish 4th, winning both games against Real Madrid and one against Barça too. When his team is in possession, De Zerbi wants to play short passing game with higher tempo and play out of defense, inviting the opponent players to press his players and to trick the opponent. In Football Manager 2023, we can replicate this setting much shorter passing and play out of defense, a fairly wide width and an higher tempo so that our team can maintain possession. Crosses are mixed, it depends also on the type of forward you have in your team. We have Sergio Leon as central forward in Valladolid (he has 13 in Heading, 11 in jumping reach) he is only 178cm tall so not a really good header and the same goes for other forwards Oscar Plano, Gonzalo Plata and Darwin Machis who played as wingers and advanced midfielder. But we had some good heading goals in our season. Leon scored 15 goals, Plano 14 playing as AMC, Machis 9 playing as Inverted winger on the left, Monchu 8 playing both as defensive midfielder and AMC when Plano was injured, Ivan Sanchez 7 goals in 11 games playing as a replacement for Gonzalo Plata as Winger on the right, Amallah 6 goals in 12 games playing as AMC, Roque Mesa 4 goals playing as Volante. In the transition phase, our team does counter-press and counter-attacking, the goalkeeper can pass the ball both to central defenders and full back and kicks it short. When the opponent has the ball, our team has an higher pressing line but a standard defensive line in order to avoid conceeding too many chances to the opponent when they play long passes from their defense or their Goalkeeper. The trigger pressing is set to more often and I want my team to prevent the opponent goal-keeper's short distribution. Let's analyze now the roles and tasks of each player Goalkeeper: Sweeper-keeper- support (S. Asenjo played very well in this role) Right back: full-back, support: Take less risks, cross less often, dribble more, shoot less often, stay wider. Ivan Fresneda played in this role for Valladolid, he had a great season, he is one of the best wonderkids in the game and probably the best young right back. Central defenders: central defender-defense: take less risks, close down less. Javi Sanchez and El Yamiq played as central defenders, not the best duo but we did not have any budget to buy other players. Left-back: Full-back, attack: take less risks, dribble more, shoot less often, stay wider: Sergio Escudero played in this role and scored 1 goal and made 9 assists, he played very well on the left flank together with the inverted winger, Machis. Defensive Midfielder Left: defensive midfielder- defense. Monchu played in this role but he also played as advanced midfielder close to the forward and he scored 6 goals and made 5 assists, he is 23 and he has very good values in passing (14), tecnique (14), ball control (14), decisions (15), team-work (13), he is the heart of our play and he has very good skills maybe because he came from La Masia (Barcelona's young team). Defensive Midfielder Right: Segundo Volante-support: take fewer risks, shoot less often, Roque Mesa played very well scoring 4 goals and making 5 assists. Advanced Midfielder-right: Winger-attack: take fewer risks, roam from position, shoot less often. Gonzalo Plata played very well, scoring 6 goals and making 11 assists, helping the central forward and the left winger to score. Advanced Midfielder- centre: Attacking midfielder-attack: take fewer risks, close down more, dribble more. Oscar Plano was the second best striker for our team with 14 goals (and he made 7 assists too) , a great season for him Central forward: Complete forward-support: Shoot less often, close down more: Sergio Leon, best striker for us, 15 goals and 4 assists. I hope this tactic works for you too. 

Please tell me your opinions about this tactic in the comments and if you have some advice or question I am here.

See you for the next tactic

Video link: 

 

MAGIC DE ZERBI BALL 4-2-3-1.fmf

[ARRIGO SACCHI 4-4-2 IL MILAN DEGLI IMMORTALI]

Hi guys and welcome to my new tactical emulation. This time I created Arrigo Sacchi's Milan degli Immortali tactic. Sacchi's revolution changed football forever, especially Italian football which was famous as defensive-catenaccio football, thanks to Sacchi's efforts became capable to play a very offensive and pleasing to the eye football and to win everything possible. In Italy there have always been many debates between two factions, one called "risultatisti" (results) which prefers winning over playing well and the other called giochisti (from "gioco" that means "game") which advocates that if you play well success will come for sure. Arrigo Sacchi was clearly a "giochista" and he was supported by AC Milan president Silvio Berlusconi who bought Milan on February 1986. Berlusconi always said that AC Milan must be world's best club and play world's best football, his revolutionary ideas matched with Sacchi, who, before becoming AC Milan's coach, had trained Parma in Serie B and defeated Milan twice in Coppa Italia (Italian Cup), shocking Milan's president who wanted him to become new Milan's coach in 1987.Sacchi's training methods caused many players to rebel against him when Milan at the beginning struggled to win even against weaker opponents, but Berlusconi said to all the players that Sacchi was meant to be Milan's coach also in the following seasons while he was not sure about AC Milan's players, from that day, Milan started playing better and winning more and more. Let's analyze Sacchi's tactic main features: first of all, high pressing and a great teamworking, every players must be able to do everything, they must play close to each other so that they will not have to run much when pressing the opponent and will not miss simple passing. Sacchi played a 4-1-2-1-2 with wide wingers (Evani and Rjikard), a deep lying playmaker (Ancelotti) and an advanced midfielder (Donadoni). The defensive line was made by two fullbacks (Tassotti and Maldini who exploited the flanks) and two great center backs (Costacurta and Baresi). Actually, Sacchi wanted Rijkard to play as center back near Baresi while Colombo and Evani played as wingers and Ancelotti always as playmaker. But during a training session, Evani was injured by a young player Albertini, so Sacchi decided to put Rjikard as midfielder replacing him with Costacurta. So let's analyze how to create this tactic in Football Manager 2023. As I said, it's a positive mentality 4-1-2-1-2 with a DLP (defense) and a Trq ( I chose trequartista role for Donadoni instead of advanced midfielder because it works more offensive and it suits better to Charles De Ketelaere who scored 17 goals in one season and made many assists). The other two midfielders are two wingers on support because I wanted to create a more balanced tactic, to avoid conceeding too many goals. The defenders are two wing-backs, the right one (Tassotti) on support (I could have set him on attack too to stick more to Tassotti's role but it would have been too dangerous) and the left one (Maldini) on attack, one center back on defend (Costacurta) and one BPD on defend (Baresi). The front-two are a complete forward on support (Gullit) and an advanced forward on attack (Marco Van Basten). Team instructions are as follows: In possession: fairly wide, shorter passing, higher tempo play out of defense, mixed crosses, work ball into box. No need to select overlapping because with two wing backs one on attack and the other on support they already overlap a lot. you can see how Theo Hernandez and Calabria overlap in the highlights. In Transition: counter-press and counter, I asked the GK to throw it long and distribute directly to full backs because Sacchi wanted Milan to launch fast counterattacks. Out of possession: higher defensive line and high press, prevent GK short distribution, trigger press much more often, step up more (for offside). This is my tactic, I won the double with Milan at first season even if I sold Leao and Saelemakers in January 2023, and I managed to buy some wonderkids and put them in the starting XI, after January bargain window I had to use some players from Milan U20 squad too but still managed great victories both in Serie A (5-0 against Juventus) and Champions League (4-1 against Real Madrid and Inter, 6-1 against Manchester City, 3-1 against Barcelona) with 0 losses in Serie A and only 2 losses in Champions. I did not well in the other two trophies, lost the Italian SuperCup against Inter and Italian Cup quarter finals against Napoli. I hope this tactic works for you too, if you like it please smash the like button and subscribe to my channel. You will find also a 4-4-2 version of the tactic but I mainly used the 1st one.

Please tell me your opinions about this tactic in the comments and if you have some advice or question I am here.

Analysis (italian) https://assoanalisti.it/analisi-tattica-milan-arrigo-sacchi/

English: https://sempremilan.com/the-genius-of-ariggo-sacchi

Video link: 

 

4-4-2 Sacchi v.3 a rombo con ruoli diversi.fmf 4-4-2 Sacchi v.2 centrocampo in linea.fmf IL MILAN DEGLI IMMORTALI.fmf

[GUARDIOLA TREBLE WINNING 3-2-4-1 2022-23]

Hi guys, this is my emulation of Pep Guardiola's 3-2-4-1, the tactic he used in the later part of the season 2022-23 winning the treble. I tested the tactic playing an entire season with Ajax by myself but to make it faster I skipped some Champions leauge matches such as the match with AC Milan when I got knocked out. I won the Erdedivisie, scoring 87 goals and allowing only 28 (best attack and second best defense) and Lorenzo Lucca won the best striker title with 31 goals in 34 apps in the Erdedivisie(on the whole season he scored 43 goals in 46 apps). But Lucca wasn't thye only one who scored a lot, Tadic also scored 16 goals, Kudus 10 and Berghuijs 9. I did not buy any player neither sold anyone, I blocked the summer 2022 transfer session and refused all offers in January 2023 session, so the squad is as it is in the game. At the same time and on the same save I tested the tactic also with Borussia Dortmund on holiday mode. I finished 5th, won 18 games, draw 5 and lost 11 games, 78 goals scored and (!) 72 goals allowed, I did not touch anything on the formation I just sent my coach on holyday since July 2022 to June 2023 when all the competitions ended, the tactic is very offensive and I think it's not good for holiday mode, but it's very good if you want to play yourself, it allows your team to always control the game and possession (with Ajax I had 75% in many games), makes your team plays very beautiful games, a lot of beautiful passes, exploiting the spaces and gaps between the opponent players. Let's examine how I created the tactic: first of all, the defensive line and the goalkeeper. Ederson is a sweeper-keeper who is very good at playing the ball and passing, so if you want to use this tactic and build the play from defense, you need a keeper with good passing values. I set him on defend to avoid too many risks. The 3 defenders: we have 2 wcb on support and one bpd on defend as center back who must take less risks and be ready to stop the opponent. In the midfield we have a regista (Rodri) on support who can roam between position and sometimes (but not often ) he ventures forward (the goal against Inter is an example, he arrived from the back) and an half back (Stones) on defend. The half-back roles allows my player to move to help teammates building the play more than a defensive midfielder or a dlp would do, he is always ready to receive passes from his teammates and also to stay wider to stretch opponents, obviously, the right wcb has to pay attention to cover the gap behind the half back. The 4 players behind the striker are two inverted winger (Grealish and Bernardo Silva) on support and two AM (Gundogan and KDB) one on support and the other on attack. About the two wingers, I asked them to stay wider to stretch the opponent and create space for other teammates to underlap in the centre. KDB's role could also be a shadow striker or an advanced playmaker but I chose an AM - attack because it allows my player to roam more into spaces as KDB does in reality. Lastly, Haaland is a complete forward on support, he will drop down to link the play and create opportunities for his teammates, he will create links with Grealish and KDB in particular. In the second tactic, more defensive, I created the box structure in the midfield with 2 mezzalas (De Bruyne and Gundogan) playing not behind the striker (Haaland) but in the center of the midfield just near Stones and Rodri). Let's examine now the team instructions The mentality is positive. In possession we have: a fairly wide width, underlap left and right to exploit better the central area, play out of defense, a must in Guardiola's tactic, shorter passing (if you want to retain possession even more you can set it to much shorter) and slightly lower tempo (much lower if you want to retain possession and take less risks), low crosses, work the ball into the box and dribble less. In transition: counter press, slow pace down, distribute to center backs, distribute to full backs. Out of possession: high press, higher defensive line, trigger press slightly more often, drop off more (to avoid the opponent plays too many long balls and scoring too much), trap inside (to force the opponent to play in the central area where it's easy to stop them. This is the tactic explanation, I hope you enjoy it

Please tell me your opinions about this tactic in the comments and if you have some advice or question I am here.

Video: 

 

NUEVO 3-2-4-1 GUARDIOLA.fmf GUARDIOLA'S 4-3-3 2022-23.fmf NUEVO 3-2-4-1 GUARDIOLA BOX MIDFIELD.fmf

[EL LOCO BIELSA 433]

Hello everybody and welcome to my new tactic emulation. This time, I am trying to rebuild Bordeaux, a great club that won the Ligue 1 7 times but in the recent years has struggled a lot and last year got relegated to Ligue 2. This is the first episode when I bring them back to Ligue 1 Why did I choose Bordeaux? Well, there are a few reasons for it, the first one is that I never tried to manage a French club on Football Manager nor in Ligue 1 neither in lower tiers, not only on FM23 but also in past editions or other football games (I play this kind of games since CM 1998-99 edition). Secondly, Bordeaux was a great team in the 1990s, even defeated my beloved AC Milan in UEFA Cup in 1995-96 season, that year Bordeaux had great players like a young Zinedine Zidane who one year later came to Juventus and won everything with Juventus, Real Madrid and France national team, and another player, Cristophe Dugarry, who scored against Milan that day, then came to Milan but did not well at Milan, while he did much better with France national team. The third reason is that, even if Marcelo Bielsa did not manage Bordeaux in France but LOSC Lille, he was hired by Lille to rebuild the club, the same happened when Leeds hired him and he won the First Division. So I wanted to use Bielsa's tactic to rebuild a great historical club like Bordeaux instead of trying with Leeds. For a tactical analysis of Marcelo Bielsa's playing style at Leeds you can see this tactical analyisis in Italian by assoanalisti. it, they are expert match analysts. Here is the link: https://assoanalisti.it/analisi-tatti... Now, let's analyze how it works on Football Manager First of all, let's examine some points which could be debated. I created a 4-3-3 tactic. I guess many of you will ask: " Why a 4-3-3? Bielsa used a 3-3-1 or 3-3-4 in attack!" Well, it's because with a defensive line with 4 defender it's still possible to create the 3+2 structure when the team plays out of defense, the DM drops down between the two central defenders, and the two full backs move forward, in line with the defensive midfielder. In Bielsa's Leeds, the defensive midfielder Philips plays a lot deeper, often as a half-back dropping into a back three (with the full backs then pushing on as wingbacks). Think of Mascherano at Barca. Philips is the same. He rarely ventures over the half way line. I could have set the DM as Half-back but I did not have a player who suits the half back role in Bordeaux squad and I did not want to do any player bargain for the first session (summer 2022) while in January 2023 with a budget of 1M. I could buy only Haaland's cousin, Tjaland. For the same reason, I did not set one of the 2 central midfielders to a mezzala role, I used a midfield with a simple central midfielder on support and a box to box midfielder). In Leeds, Klich is more advanced in midfield. I'd describe him as either B2B or Mezalla. Since Bielas exploit the width in all areas of the pitch to stretch the opposition which creates the space fo the passing, I used the instruction stay wider for the wingers (one as an inside forward- attack and the other as winger-attack) and in this tactic we have lots of crossing from the wingers. About the central forward, I had 3 choices: deep lying forward and complete forward on support to ask the player to drop down to link the play with his teammates and advanced forward, who would instead care only about scoring and create goals but also (as the game itself says), to be the focal point of attacking moves, win possession and chase misplaced balls or clearances from deep, a task that our forward, the Slovenian Vipotnik does very well (Bordeaux bought Vipotnik this month and I used the sortitutsi updated database with most recent transfers). Vipotnik was also one of the reasons I wanted to try Bordeaux, because he is a potential wonderkid and I have never tested him before. Let's analyze team instructions: Positive mentality to avoid to conceed too many goals with an attacking one In possession: width: wide, shorter pass, higher tempo, underlap left and right, pass into space, whipped crosses, work ball into box. In transition: counter-press, counter, distribute to full backs and center backs, take short kicks Out of possession: high press, standard defensive line (with this we conceeed only 27 goals in 38 games), get stuck in, much more often press. In the video you can find Bielsa's marking settings to make the tactic more realistic and stick to Bielsa's philosophy, but it worked better if you set the opponent instructions. If you want to try the one-to-one marking setting please try it and let me know.

Please tell me your opinions about this tactic in the comments and if you have some advice or question I am here.

Video link: 

 

4-3-3 BIELSABALL.fmf

[SVEN GORAN ERIKSSON'S 1998-99 LAZIO TACTIC]

Hi guys 

Welcome to my new tactic emulation. 

This time I emulated Sven Goran Eriksson’s Lazio 4-1-4-1, the tactic he used in season 1999-2000 when he won Italian Serie A. 

If we consider Serie A from the 1950s onwards as the hunting ground of the three giants of our football (Juventus, Milan, and Inter have won 55 out of the last 68 championships between 1950 and 2018), we must go back to the late 1990s and the early 2000s to see the dominance of the 'striped' teams being strongly challenged by the competition.

Those were the years of the 'seven sisters', of ambitious provincial teams that lived beyond their means, and of the Roman clubs taking the spotlight around the year 2000, coinciding with the Jubilee organized in the capital. In the 2000/01 season, Roma won a championship that they led from the first to the last matchday. The previous season, Lazio overtook Juventus on the final matchday thanks to a remarkable comeback. However, it wasn't just an underdog's last-minute push; it was the assertion of one of the strongest teams of that moment, in Italy and in Europe. In fact, the president of that Lazio, Sergio Cragnotti, never hid his ambitions. 'The important thing is to be protagonists,' he said in September 1999, after winning the Cup Winners' Cup and finishing second in Serie A the previous season. 'In the end, only one team wins, and Lazio has all the prerequisites to do so even in the most prestigious continental competition. Second place and the Champions League would be another great achievement.'

He reiterated this concept after Lazio's elimination in the Champions League quarter-finals at the hands of Valencia in the spring of 2000. 'I'm sure we could have overcome the round against Valencia because we're superior to the Spaniards. It's a shame about that strange match in the first leg. Disappointment? Yes, a lot. Now, however, I want to build a great team to reach the Champions League final next year. We're close to making that famous leap forward.' Even a more balanced figure like coach Sven-Göran Eriksson had expressed himself in May 2000. 'To complete the job, I want to win the Champions League. 10 years ago, I reached the final with Benfica, but there was nothing to be done against Sacchi's Milan. There's nothing missing in Rome to try again; the environment is exceptional.

The team, managed by Sven-Göran Eriksson and led by players like Verón, Nedved, Nesta, and Salas, achieved remarkable success that season. The text covers various aspects of the team's gameplay, including their midfield excellence, offensive strategies, defensive approach, and key players' roles. Lazio's midfield was considered one of the best in the world, and their playing style was characterized by verticality, quick transitions, and creativity from players like Verón and Nedved. The team utilized a dynamic formation and adapted its tactics based on opponents, resulting in a fluid and versatile playstyle. Despite defensive vulnerabilities, the team's offensive prowess led to trophies like the Serie A title and Coppa Italia, marking a peak in the club's history. The success of that season is contrasted with the subsequent decline of the team due to financial issues and changes in management.

That Lazio will be able to refute even the common belief that a great goalscorer is a conditio sine qua non for winning the tricolore. Because in fact, Bobo Vieri, transferred to Inter for 90 million, was not replaced with a striker of equal weight: the Roman management will fruitlessly pursue Nicolas Anelka, who will move to Real Madrid after a long courtship, and then Crespo and Claudio López (who will only arrive the following summer). In the end, Vieri will be numerically replaced by the 23-year-old Simone Inzaghi, who had scored 15 goals in 30 matches at Piacenza in his Serie A debut, to whom Ravanelli, acquired in the winter transfer window, will be added. A bit like Conte's first Juventus, Lazio will manage to compensate for the absence of a top scorer by getting goals from 15 players, but only one in double digits (Salas, 12 goals, followed by Veron, 8 goals, and Mihajlovic, 6), for a total of 64 goals, one less than the most prolific attacking team, the reigning champions Milan.

However, the biancocelesti had enhanced an already excellent midfield - which could count on Nedved and Conceição on the wings, as well as Almeyda in the center and a highly versatile Stankovic in the early part of his career - with Simeone, included in the deal for Vieri and valued at around 20 billion lire, Sensini and Verón, both brought from Parma for respectively 10 and 53 billion lire, which made "la brujita" the most expensive purchase in the club's history, surpassed the following summer by Crespo.

Already from the European Super Cup, Eriksson decides to base the team on the midfield, "the best in the world," at least according to the late Alberto D'Aguanno, deploying an extremely fluid 4-5-1 formation, which could be adapted into a 4-2-3-1, 4-3-3, or 4-4-2 depending on the players and the moments of the match, where Nedved, nominally playing as a left mezzala, or Mancini, starting from the left flank, accompany the central striker.

The winners of the last edition of the Cup Winners' Cup play against the European champions Manchester United for 90 minutes, manipulating the English midfield at their will and ending with a narrow victory (1-0, goal by Salas) that doesn't do justice to the dominance displayed on the field. "For the final, I knew I didn't have many strikers capable of lasting the full 90 minutes, so I relied on a 4-5-1 formation that convinced me," Eriksson declares after the match. "With Mancini or Nedved on the wings on one side and Lombardo or Conceição on the other, covered centrally by either Sensini or Almeyda, there's more space for everyone to move forward. In fact, in the first half, I really liked the team's style of play. In fact, I tell you that the Lazio I imagine is precisely this (...) I give a highly positive meaning to the ability of this team to build up the game."

 

Eriksson starts the season by fielding the striking duo of Salas and Inzaghi, but the experiment lasts only for the space of three matchdays: after a 3-0 victory against Torino at home on the third matchday, Simone Inzaghi and Salas will only play together from the start in two more matches in the return leg. In the year of the Scudetto, the biancocelesti line up with a single central reference, potentially supported by either Mancini or Boksic, who in defensive phases drop back to the midfield line. However, neither the current National Team coach nor the Croatian will manage to provide a significant contribution, the former hindered by his 36 years (for "Mancio", who won't even score a goal in the 1999/00 season, this marks his final year at Lazio and practically his last notable experience in playing football, except for a brief stint at Leicester in the winter of 2001), and the latter by chronic knee problems.

The Swedish coach, particularly in important matches, lines up with five midfielders, free to distribute spaces depending on contingencies: the only fixed points were the right winger, Conceição (or alternatively Stankovic), who surged down the flank with the steadiness and regularity of a freight train, and a holding midfielder, Almeyda or Sensini, to utilize their qualities in long-range play and defensive shielding. The other three positions are variables, which, simplifying, are filled by another central midfielder closer to the holding one, a left winger with ample freedom of movement, and another mezzala/trequartista to bridge the midfield and attack.

 

The role of the positional midfielder is primarily interpreted by Simeone, less influential in the offensive phase compared to his time at Atlético Madrid. In Spain, he was a box-to-box midfielder ahead of his time, constantly pushing forward to accompany and finish actions, his dribbles reminiscent of a slalom by Marcel Hirscher in terms of impact and agility. However, the Swedish coach primarily used him as a stabilizer for a team that easily stretched out, asking him to stay close to the holding midfielder to help cover the width of the field and press forward to engage opponents, thanks to an unmatched intensity. For this reason, much like the fighting spirit expressed by the Atlético Madrid he would later manage from 2011, "Cholo" is remembered more as a man of aggression and quantity, overshadowing the equally significant technical aspects of his game.

At Lazio, he advances only when the action is consolidated or on set pieces, where he is a threat: out of the 30 goals scored in Serie A, a remarkable 19 were headers. In that season, he scores 5 goals, all headers and all in the last seven matchdays. The first is the most crucial, as it secures an away victory against Juventus – who were 9 points ahead of Lazio before the match – reopening the Scudetto race. He will also find the net in the first leg of the Coppa Italia final (also, of course, with a header) against Inter, sealing the 2-1 victory that Eriksson's men will defend in the return leg at San Siro (0-0).

Nedved, on the other hand, oscillates between the center-left and a more external position, depending on the presence of a second striker or Verón: when the former Parma player is on the field, he covers the left flank defensively, while with Mancini or Boksic, he tightens up alongside the holding midfielder when the ball is lost. Although his offensive gameplay doesn't change much in practice, he roams across the entire front, alternating between inside tracks and inside-outside cuts. The same applies to Verón, formally a left winger, or a central mezzala/trequartista when Nedved covers the width, whose purpose remains centralizing the game and creating numerical superiority in the ball zone.

In the last two months of the season, when Lazio needed to win practically all matches to catch up with Juventus, Eriksson proposed an even more daring formation, with only one defensive midfielder (either Almeyda, Sensini, or Simeone), accompanied by two trequartisti (Verón and Nedved), two forwards (either Inzaghi or Salas in the center, along with either Boksic or Mancini on the left wing), and Conceição on the right.

One of Lazio's most offensive versions, here in the European Super Cup against Manchester United: two forwards, Mancini and Salas, and three offensive midfielders, Stankovic, Nedved, and Verón, with the latter two moving behind the second English line, covered by Almeyda.

Verticality and the Importance of Verón and Nedved

In a frenetic and direct style of football like that of the 1990s, where the goal is to reach the opponent's goal as quickly as possible while minimizing risks, and control of the game is expressed more through territorial supremacy than ball possession, Lazio plays an equally vertical football, whose effectiveness increases against long teams, where it can take advantage of space to frequently find the most creative players, organizing a more reasoned offensive phase.

In the early stages of the game, Lazio tries to gain ground and expand the distances within the opponent's formation through long play: it relies on the passes from defenders (particularly Nesta and Mihajlovic) or alternatively from a midfielder (Simeone and Almeyda) to the striker, while the two central midfielders move behind the opponent's midfield line to collect any second balls. If the forward controls the ball, they pass it to the nearest teammate who, if no useful passing lanes are available ahead, switches to the wing player. The wing player then either opts for a cross from the byline or the edge of the box, with the central striker, winger, and mezzala on the weak side filling the box. If the ball comes out from the fullbacks, it goes to the high-positioned wing player on the same side, who attacks the space behind the defensive line, or receives the ball to dribble past the marker, aiming to create numerical superiority to be utilized in the final 40 meters.

 

Inzaghi and Salas, alternately fielded, become the stepping stones used to progress up the field. The two forwards are tasked with dropping deeper and playing as a pivot for their teammates. This strategy highlights the physical and technical qualities of the Chilean, who is skilled at linking up with teammates, shielding the ball, and withstanding challenges despite his modest height (173 cm according to Wikipedia). Salas attracts the marking defender out of position, plays a quick pass, and returns to the box to receive a cross, utilizing his powerful header. Inzaghi, on the other hand, is more of a finisher who excels at attacking depth and closing lateral plays. The 1999/2000 season remains the pinnacle of his career, with a total of 19 goals, including 9 in 11 Champions League appearances, four of which were scored in a single match, the 5-1 victory against Marseille in the second group stage.

When they move the ball quickly and seek to go deep immediately, Lazio refines their play through the flanks because, without proper possession consolidation, they struggle to occupy the central attacking third. On the wings, however, they progress up the field more naturally: thanks to overlapping runs by the left-back, Pancaro or Favalli, and the extended dribbling runs of a player like Conceição on the right, they manage to draw opponents to the strong side. The opponents, in sliding laterally, expose the center and create space for the midfielders' runs. It's no coincidence that several goals have come from crosses.

However, Lazio becomes a devastating and entertaining team when they manage to organize their offensive phase. They achieve this when they play through the midfield, specifically when Verón and Nedved are set up for continuous play. The Argentine and the Czech have contrasting relationships with the ball: Verón is drawn to it like a metal to a magnet, while Nedved moves away from it to create space and be available for a pass while on the run. Verón positions himself around the ball to provide a safe passing lane for his teammates. Once he receives the ball, he decides how to break the opponent's lines: with a switch of play, a direct pass, or a dribble. Although sometimes a forced style of play, the benefits (positional advantages/key passes/shots) far outweigh the costs (lost balls/counterattacks).

"Verón is our playmaker. When he performs well, the entire team performs well," acknowledges Eriksson, who faced difficulties between the end of the first half of the season and the beginning of the second half, coinciding with a downturn in Verón's form. In the first 12 matches of 2000, Lazio only gained 19 points, managing just two draws against teams like Venezia, Cagliari, Reggina, and Verona. Despite the mid-season dip, Verón would experience one of his best seasons, the only one in his career in which he reached double figures (eight goals in Serie A and two in the Champions League). A year in which he established himself as one of the world's best playmakers, even though he was somewhat overshadowed in Italy by the presence of other greats like Zidane and Rui Costa.

Furthermore, Lazio demonstrates itself to be a modern team in terms of exploiting vertical corridors: while Conceição firmly guards the right flank, with Negro overlapping only when the Portuguese player requires assistance against a 1 vs 2 situation, more fluid interactions occur on the center-left between the fullback, the winger/second striker, and the interior midfielder. The catalyst in these cases is Nedved: his runs, with or without the ball, determine the positional structure on his side. If the Czech player converges towards the center around the midfield line, the attacking midfielder compensates by occupying the wide area or the space behind the midfield (with the defender pushing forward). If he spreads out, the wide forward fills the area. Nedved's acceleration allows Lazio to advance centrally, pulling opponents out of position and opening up spaces and passing lanes, particularly for the insertion of an interior midfielder. Nedved becomes a significant factor when he pairs up with Boksic or, even better, with Pancaro, a player who impressed me retrospectively for his ambidexterity, speed, and determination. A full-back not just in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality in ball control and finishing.

Another two examples of Lazio's offensive plays triggered by Nedved: in the first case, the Czech player moves inwards and Boksic makes the opposite movement; in the second case, the same pairing occurs with the Croatian forward, but this time Inzaghi vacates the area to set up Stankovic's run.

Another precious resource for this team is set-pieces, which accounted for 23 of the total 64 goals scored in the league, almost 36% of the total. For comparison, Lazio's last season with 89 goals saw 26 from set-pieces, but with four more matchdays and nine penalties, two more than those awarded to Eriksson's men. Both Verón and Mihajlovic are dangerous from direct and indirect free-kicks, with the former using a lofted shot and the latter a curling shot on the inside of his foot. Mihajlovic takes corners from the right, while Verón takes those from the left. Against Verona, Verón even scored directly from a corner kick. The central defender, after scoring 9 goals the previous year, did even better this season, reaching a total of 13 goals across Serie A, Coppa Italia, and the Champions League, including 7 from direct free-kicks.

An Ambitious Defensive Phase

Although they often stretched and placed 4-5 players above the ball line, Lazio never aggressively pursued ball recovery in high zones. Their objective was rather to compact the team into a 4-1-4-1 formation, with the midfield line dropping and the defensive line advancing to reduce distances between units. Eriksson's team never pressed the opponent's initial build-up either; at most, one forward would advance to around 60-70 meters to pressure the ball carrier and force them into making a mistake.

 

The problem is that, loving wide spaces but without any re-aggression or proper preventive attitudes, Lazio inevitably splits in two when possession is lost: one line formed by the four defenders, with the defensive midfielder dropping back alongside them, and further up the field, the other five offensive players, arranged in a more or less orderly manner. If the team fails to fully reform the first line, during defensive transitions, a block of 3-4 players is formed to guard the center of the field, or even worse, the defensive midfielder and positional midfielder end up defending the entire width of the field.

A bold choice, Eriksson's decision to focus the basic eleven on the offensive phase: Lazio becomes vulnerable to counterattacks and plays between the lines, but at the same time, it aligns with a defensive style that prefers to defend by moving forward rather than backward. In fact, Mihajlovic and Nesta like to break the line to challenge the player with the ball far from the goal, in order to disrupt the opponent's action as quickly as possible and deny depth.

In particular, Nesta's sliding tackle becomes his trademark, almost an inevitable reaction when facing a player within his orbit (even from a distance of up to three meters) who reveals the ball. The timing and precision of a player who, with almost every challenge, risks a card or being bypassed, but most of the time enters with a violence and brutality that transform into elegance due to the surgical precision of his intervention, whether frontal or lateral, with his right leg extended forward. This is why the nickname "perfect storm," attributed to him by Milan's commentator-fan Carlo Pellegatti, exemplifies his game - lightning-fast in timing and thunderous in execution - which mercilessly descends upon the opponent. A kind of seemingly risky "all in" move that actually represents a play with a very high probability of success.

More generally, the type of marking can vary depending on the match, although the basic approach is a mixed zone marking. For instance, against teams that deploy many players or have particularly mobile players, it can be refined into a purer zone marking. Notably, Nesta remains the defender most inclined to break the line. Against teams that employ only one wide player per flank, such as Zaccheroni's Milan or Ancelotti's Juventus, when a central forward widens, the fullback steps out to engage the attacker, while the wide player drops back to provide cover.

In passive defensive phases, the white-and-blue team drops back into the first third of the field, forming a 4-1-4-1 formation that aims to maintain order and uniform coverage of spaces. However, in reality, this is a team that struggles to sustain extended periods without the ball, often getting drawn out of position and conceding good scoring opportunities. Additionally, the defensive line, while excelling in defending away from the goal (even in situations of parity or numerical disadvantage), is almost inherently forced to endure pressure as it lacks consistent support from other areas of the team. Ultimately, Eriksson's team manages to achieve a total of 26 clean sheets, but they also concede 54 goals in 59 matches, averaging almost one goal conceded every 90 minutes

Now, let's analyze how I emulated the tactic in Football Manager. First of all, the formation is a 4-1-4-1 with a more attacking variant with the inverted winger Nedved (or Mancini or Boksic) who plays as a third forward , closer to the central forward rather than in the same line with the other midfielders. The mentality is balanced to avoid conceeding too many goals. The team instructions are as follows: fairly wide width, play out of defense, overlap right and left, focus play down the right because Conceiçao continually moves up and down the right flank like a train, slightly more direct passes, slightly higher tempo because Lazio wanted to play immediately forward, not patiently retaining the ball, but not too fast, low crosses, hit early crosses, run at defense, be more disciplined. In transition: regroup because Lazio did not press high, but preferred to drop down thus giving space to the opponent (it was a risky move in fact defensive side was not so strong), counter-attack because as soon they could get the ball, they played long ball to counter-attack, take short kicks and distribute to center backs (Nesta and Mihajlovic were both good at playing the ball from defense, that's why I set them as bpd). Out of possession: higher defensive line, mid block, standard pressing, get stuck in (famous Nesta sliding tackle, he was excellent and seldom got yellow cards or reds), drop off more. Now, player roles GK: simple gk, defend. right back: full back, cross aim far post, close down more. Central defenders: bpd, defend, close down more, mark tighter, tackle harder only for Nesta (right cd), left back: wing back support close down more, cross aim far post, defensive midfielder- defend, right midfielder: winger, attack, cross aim far post, left midfielder: inverted winger, attack, take more risks, cross from deep, cross aim far post, shoot more often, roam from position, right central midfielder: box to box midfielder support, left central midfielder advanced playmaker, pass it shorter, roam from position. This was Veron's role, in the second tactic to make it more realistic, I tried it as Roaming Playmaker because you could find him everywhere, he was the core of Lazyo playing style. You can try both. Forward: central forward-attack: pass shorter, shoot less often. That's all for this tactic.  

Please tell me your opinions about this tactic in the comments and if you have some advice or question I am here.

Youtube video link: 

 

LAZIO ERIKSSON OFFENSIVA 4-1-4-1 ASIMMETRICO.fmf LA LAZIO 1999-2000 DI ERIKSSON 4-1-4-1.fmf

[Alex Ferguson's 1998-99 Tactic at Manchester Utd]

Hello guys, welcome to my new tactic emulation  This time I tried to emulated Sir Alex Ferguson's tactic at Manchester Utd in the season 1998-1999, when he won the treble (Premier League, Cup and Champions League). Well, I did even better because I won not 2 but three domestic trophies and the UEFA Champions League. I used the 1998-99 season database you can find online so I emulated in all aspects that great season. I tried (unless I had injuries or red cards) to keep the same starting XI Ferguson' used as you can see in the video, and I did not buy/sell any player in the two player bargains sessions of the season 2022-23. With this tactic you can see a great and attacking play, a lot of crosses and a lot of beautiful goals. Yorke scored around 60 goals in this season and Cole scored around 40. Our team Xg were well above average with a 2,92 xG per game. Despite being an attacking tactic, we had the 3rd best defense of the Premier League with only 33 goals (0,87 goals x game) conceeded, behind Liverpool (23 goals conceeded) and Arsenal (29). Let's now analyze how I created this tactic on Football Manager 2023. Ferguson during his career mostly used a standard 4-4-2 formation with an exception in the season 2007-08 when he won his second and last Champions League in the final agains Chelsea. In the season 1998-99 he used a 4-4-2, so in Football Manager we start with a standard 4-4-2, with an attacking mentality. I created two different version of this 4-4-2, the second is different only in the positions of Giggs and Beckham, who play as an inverted winger and a wide playmaker instead of as two wingers. I tried this variation to stick more to their real roles in Ferguson's Manchester, because Giggs loved to cut inside with the ball from the left while David Beckham loved to play in the center too, rather than only on the right side like a winger does. My first tactic maybe suits better to the game AI while the second is more realistic. Anyway, I tested both of them during this season and I had outstanding results and always played a pleasing to the eye football as you can see in the highlights. Except for these differences in Beckham and Giggs roles, the 2 tactics are the same. Let's analyze now the player roles. As goalkeeper, we have a simple gk on defend, then we have two full-backs on support, a ball playing defender and a central defender both on defend. The midfield 4-lines is made by two wingers (Beckham and Giggs) on attack, a deep-lying playmaker on defend (Scholes) and a box to box midfielder (Keane). Lastly, the forward-duo Cole-Yorke, we have two advanced forwards on attack. Now, let's examine the team instructions. In possession: attacking width: fairly wide, Ferguson wanted to exploit the flanks but also the central area so I used the single player's instruction to decide what to do. Pass into space, overlap left and right because the full-backs, the Newille twins could overlap very often exploiting the space left by Giggs and Beckham when they cut inside. Play out of defence. Sligthly more direct passes and higher tempo because Ferguson wanted his team to play faster and not retain possession too much. Low crosses, play for set pieces, run at defense, be more expressive (this instruction with great players like Manchester Utd had in that season is a must). In transition: counter-press and counter because Ferguson wanted his team to press the opponent and once gained the ball, start a fast counter-attack and go straight to the goal, we scored a lot of goals by counter-attacks. As for the GK passing instructions, I set him to pass the ball both to central defenders and full backs to give him more options and take short kicks. Out of possession: High press, higher defensive line, trigger press: more often (not much more often because Manchester Utd knew when to wait in order to avoid the opponent played long-balls behind Manchester's lines when the team was pressing. Prevent short gk distribution and step up more In Football Manager 2023, the instruction step up more tells the players to use the off-side trap like in FM 22 the instruction "use off-side trap" did. That's all for this tactic, I hope it works for you too. 

Please tell me your opinions about this tactic in the comments and if you have some advice or question I am here.

Link video: 

 

ALEX FERGUSON'S EMULATION 442.fmf ALEX FERGUSON'S EMULATION 442 V2.fmf

[An attacking 3-4-3 Gasperini's Genoa 2013-16 emulation]

you are right but I had to adjust it to Genoa situation. If I conceeded 45 goals with standard defensive line, you can just imagine how many goals I would have conceeded with an higher defensive line. In fact in some matches against stronger opponents when he was Genoa manager he tried to adjust his defense more.

Gasperini defends higher up the pitch  with Atalanta and I am making his Atalanta tactics too, the first he used also in UEFA Champions League 2019-20 when he won 4-0 against Valencia is a 3-4-2-1  (the "2" were Alejandro Gomez and Josip Ilicic") then the second is the tactic he uses now a 3-4-1-2. 

[An attacking 3-4-3 Gasperini's Genoa 2013-16 emulation]

Hi everyone

I am Italian, I play Football Manager and other similar games since 1998 (when I loved playing CM and PC Calcio) and I always loved the tactical aspect of Football, I read many famous managers interviews (Sacchi, Capello, Guardiola, Klopp, etc) to understand the way they play and how they keep their players motivated and determined. A great manager who did not achieve all the results he deserved is in my opinion Gian Piero Gasperini.

He started his career as manager at Juventus where he took over the manager seat of young squad (now it's called Juventus Next Gen but at that time there was not a second squad, but only the Juventus Primavera team, which played with other same age teams, under 17, it's a bad trait of Italian system that does not allow young players to play in more competitive leagues against older pro players, that's also one of the main reasons we do so bad with national team) then he left and tried to become a first-squad manager. His first experience was at Crotone in Serie  C (3 rd division) where he won the play-off and got promoted to Serie B (2nd division). Then he got hired from Genoa in Serie A where he stayed from 2006 to 2010. In 2011 he got his first chance with a big team, Inter Milan, but he got sacked after a few games, Inter had won the treble in 2010 with Jose Mourinho and it was very difficult for the managers who followed him (Benitez, Leonardo and Gasperini) to ask players to follow their instructions as they did with Mou, at the same time, Inter chairman, Massimo Moratti was not willing to sell those players who made his dream come true (win the Champions League as his dad Angelo Moratti did twice) and this finally lead to Inter nearly go bankrupt and Moratti sold the club to Erick Tohir, an Indonesian businessman. Gasperini was not lucky to get the first big team opportunity in that particular period of Inter history. After getting sacked from Inter, in 2012 he went to Palermo where he stayed for only 1 season and in 2013 he came back to Genoa, where he stayed until 2016 finishing 13th, 6th and 11th. It's the 3-4-3 he used at Genoa that I tried to emulate with this tactic. 

I tested it with Genoa with new updated database (Genoa got promoted to Serie A so I started with Genoa in Serie A) and finished 5th, just 1 point behind Milan and won the Italian Cup. As you can see from the screenshots, it's a extremely good tactic in attack but lacks in defense even if I am not sure it will be the same if I test it with stronger teams with stronger defense, I did not made any great change to the squad, I just bought some younger players for the second team, and the starting eleven is the same of the beginning, I blocked the summer 2022 transfer session and just managed to buy younger players in the January 2023 session. Retegui is already at Genoa, and he scored 22 goals in Serie A, with also 14 assists, while the poacher, Flavio Junior Bianchi, a Genoa wonderkid, scored 20 goals even if he did not play a lot of games in the first part of the season. The third forward on the left, Mattia Aramu scored 9 goals with 6 assists, Another player who really played well in this season is Aaron, the left wing-back, he did 21 assists in 37 apps and was the top assistman in Serie A. On the right side, Sabelli (24 apps, 7 assists) and Hefti (23-2) alternated as wing-back.

It's a 3-4-3 with a positive mentality, it works better than a balanced mentality that I intended to use at first. The width is fairly wide, and in possession we have: much shorter passing, higher tempo, focus play down left and right and overlap left and right, pass into space, low crosses and run at defence. In transition: counter-press, counter, distribute to center backs and take short kicks. Out of possession: high pressing, standard defensive line, trigger press much more often, prevent short gk distribution.

Let's examine now the player roles and instructions. First of all, we have a sweeper-keeper on defend with the instruction to take fewer risks. In the defensive trio: we have 2 ball playing-defenders with defensive task and with the same instruction to dribble more and a libero on support with the instructions to dribble less, hold position and tackle harder. On the two sides we have two wing-backs on support, both with the instruction to stay wider. Then, as central midfielders, we have 2 segundo volantes, this is how I tried to replicate Gasperini's two CM. Both of them are set on support and have same instructions: pass it shorter, take more risks, get further forward, mark tighter, shoot less often. Finally, the forward trio, we have 2 advanced forwards set on attack with the instructions to shoot less often and take more risks, and a poacher on the centre with the only instruction to shoot more often. 

That's all for this tactic, please tell me your opinions thank you very much

GASPERINI GENOA 3-4-3 TRIDENTE.fmf

[CAPTAIN TSUBASA JAPAN TACTICS]

Hello guys, this time I created a tactic from scratch without any tactical analysis available online so I need some advices. I guess many of you know the famous Japanese manga-anime Captain Tsubasa by Yoichi Takahashi. It is without any doubts a masterpiece of Japanese mangas, and even if it was written in 1981, it's popular still now everywhere in the world. Several videogames about Captain Tsubasa have been created in the past years and I recently played one of them, Captain Tsubasa Rise of New Champions. The third tactic I show on this video is an emulation of Japan national team's tactic in this game. I used the Captain Tsubasa database with all players from anime and manga available that I found on FM scout. I created 3 tactics, the first one is an emulation of Japan U16 4-2-2-2. If someone of you watched the anime or read the manga, you maybe remember the 4 defenders line (Ishizaki, Jito, Matsuyama and Soda), the 4 midfielders, 2 more advanced (Tsubasa and Misaki) and 2 behind them (usually Tachibana twins were placed in the starting XI but could often have been replaced by Kojiro Hyuga's friend Takeshi Sawada and Izawa) and two forwards, Nitta and Hyuga. The mentality is positive. The team instructions are as follows: In possession:attacking width: wide, passing into space, overlap left and right and focus play down the left and the right (yes, you can choose those two instructions together if you want to let your players exploit the flanks, it's not counter-productive, I saw my team playing the way I wanted), play out of defense to let my players play patiently and not too fast, higher tempo, shorter passing, low crosses, work the ball into box. In transition: Counter-press, counter, distribute to flanks ( to avoid goalkeeper misses the passes to the central defenders or full backs creating chances for the opponent players if they press high), take short kicks. Out of possession: high press, higher defensive line, trigger press more often or much more often (choose it wisely, if you press too much your players will be too tired), drop off more (to avoid giving too much space to the opponent when they play a long ball from their defense), stop crosses. The team instructions are the same also for the other two tactics I created. Let's now examine players roles. Gk: Genzo Wakabayashi: a simple goalkeeper in defense, pass it shorter. Rb: Ryo Ishizaki: full back-defend, pass it shorter, mark tighter, sit narrower (when the opponent attacks, he will sit narrower to close gaps in the defensive line) Rcb: Hiroshi Jito: central defender-defend: close down less, mark tighter, take fewer risks, pass it shorter Lcb: Matsuyama Hikaru (before Misugi recovered and came back, Matsuyama who was a midfielder, played very well as defender and that was his role during World Cup U16): Ball playing defender-defend: pass it shorter, close down less, mark tigther Lb: Makoto Soda, wing back-support, he is a more offensive player than Ryo Ishizaki so I set him as a wing-back: take fewer risks, pass it shorter, cross fr post, dribble more, shoot more often (you can remove this, I picked it because Soda has a great shot), close down more, mark tigther, stay wider. Cm-right: Masao Tachibana (or Takeshi Sawada ): DLP-defend: close down more, mark tigther Cm-left: Kazuo Tachibana (orMamoru Izawa ): mezzala-support Am right: Taro Misaki, advanced playmaker-support: close down more Am-left: Tsubasa Ozora: advanced playmaker-attack get further forward, move into channels. Rforward: Shun Nitta Deep-lying forward: close down less, dribble less, pass shorter, shoot less often L forward: Kojiro Hyuga, advanced forward-attack: close down less. Variants: in tactic 2, I tried to emulate Japan Olympic Team tactic, that was a 4-1-3-2 tactic with Misugi playing as a ball playing defender and Matsuyama back to his former role in the midfield (I set him as an half back to let him venture forward and try to shoot too), the 3-men line behind the 2 forwards has Misaki and Aoi playing as advanced playmakers but on the flanks instead of in the center, while Tsubasa plays as trequartista in the center. In the third tactic, a 4-2-2-2 with 2 wide wingers, we have also a Segundo volante- support in the left and a DM in the right, you can set the left winger as an advanced playmaker to exploit the link with the volante if you want. That's all for this tactic explanation, what do you think? 

CAPTAIN TSUBASA 4-2-2-2 .fmf CAPTAIN TSUBASA 4-1-3-2 OLYMPIC.fmf CAPTAIN TSUBASA 4-2-2-2 WIDE.fmf